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“[W]hen someone buys a book, they are also buying the right to resell that book,
to loan it out, or to even give it away if they want. Everyone understands this.”
— Jeff Bezos, CEO of Amazon.com1
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you purchase a new book from Amazon. You visit Amazon.com,
find a book that looks promising, click the familiar Buy Now button, wait a mere
two days for Amazon Prime delivery, and promptly place that new volume on
your bookshelf, waiting for the perfect rainy day to crack it open. The next
morning, you wake up to find a book-sized gap on your shelf. Your book has
disappeared. Just then, you receive an email from Amazon customer service
explaining that—at the copyright holder’s request—the book has been recalled.
Amazon informs you that it dispatched a drone to your home to silently
and carefully retrieve the book while you slept in order to avoid any
inconvenience. But not to worry, Amazon reassures you, your account has
already been credited with a refund.
Most consumers would be outraged at such an intrusion, not only because
of the physical violation it entails, but also because it contravenes some basic
assumptions about the nature of personal property rights. When we buy a
book, we own it; it is our property. And one right traditionally associated with
personal property is the ability to keep the things you own for as long as you

1 Tim O’Reilly, Jeff Bezos’ Open Letter on Used Book Sales, O’REILLY COMMUNITY (Apr. 15,
2002, 11:17 AM), http://archive.oreilly.com/pub/wlg/1291 [https://perma.cc/WL58-MGDJ]. Bezos
offered this defense of the rights of book buyers in response to criticism by the Author’s Guild of
America regarding Amazon’s prominent marketing of used books on its site. See David D.
Kirkpatrick, Online Sales of Used Books Draw Protest, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2002), http://www.nytimes.
com/2002/04/10/business/online-sales-of-used-books-draw-protest.html [https://perma.cc/78FG-X
B32] (reporting on the Authors Guild’s email to its members encouraging them to not “be complicit”
in “Amazon’s ‘notorious used-book service’”).

2017]

What We Buy When We Buy Now

317

choose.2 They cannot be taken from you without your consent, certainly not
by private actors for their own benefit.3
As unthinkable as this scenario may be, it is almost exactly what happened
to Amazon Kindle users in 2009.4 In response to disputes with publishers,
Amazon remotely deleted the locally stored copies of a number of books from
the devices of consumers.5 The deleted books ranged from those by Ayn Rand
to Harry Potter.6 But perhaps most tellingly, they included George Orwell’s
Nineteen Eighty-Four.7 In that dystopian classic, the Ministry of Truth, the
novel’s fictional government, destroyed documents by tossing them into the
memory hole, a network of tubes leading to an incinerator.8 Kindle users—
perhaps struck by the irony—went to bed one night thinking they owned a
copy of Orwell’s cautionary tale only to wake up the next morning to find
that their books had vanished down a different series of tubes.9
More prosaically, media companies—even large, reputable ones—have
sometimes shut down or otherwise deprived consumers access to paid digital
media. Google, Major League Baseball, MSN Music, Sony, Virgin Digital,
Walmart, and Yahoo have all shuttered digital media services, or at least
2 See, e.g., A. M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 112-15 (A.G.
Guest ed., 1961) (identifying the right of possession as one of eleven incidents of ownership).
3 Even the state’s considerable power of eminent domain is constrained to takings that serve
some public purpose. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005) (explaining that
“the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another
private party B”); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) (“A purely private taking
could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose
of government and would thus be void.”).
4 See Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Orwell Books from Kindle, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/18amazon.html [https://perma.cc/RZV5-8H
DP] (reporting on Amazon’s forced deletion of George Orwell’s novels from certain Kindle owners’
devices). This power to remotely remove or disable purchases is not limited to eReaders like the
Amazon Kindle. See, e.g., Matt Buchanan, Apple Can Remotely Disable Apps Installed on Your iPhone,
GIZMODO (Aug. 6, 2008, 6:15 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5034007/apple-can-remotely-disable-apps-install
ed-on-your-phone [https://perma.cc/JW58-DDWV] (reporting on Apple’s ability to remotely disable
iPhone applications, regardless of user consent); Gregg Keizer, Microsoft: We Can Remotely Delete Windows
8 Apps, COMPUTERWORLD (Dec. 8, 2011, 1:57 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2500036/
desktop-apps/microsoft—we-can-remotely-delete-windows-8-apps.html [https://perma.cc/QCX7-9XTD]
(describing Microsoft’s ability to disable or eliminate applications from users’ Windows 8 devices).
5 See Stone, supra note 4 (reporting on Amazon’s remote deletion of e-books off of users’ Kindles).
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 See GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949).
9 Senator Ted Stevens was mocked for describing the Internet as a “series of tubes” in 2006,
but this analogy is not far off the mark. See Michael J. Socolow, Ted Stevens Wins: The Internet’s Tubes
Will Be Unclogged, SLATE (Jan. 15, 2014, 10:48 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2014/01
/15/net_neutrality_struck_down_in_a_victory_for_the_late_sen_ted_stevens.html [https://perma.cc/FL
N8-LTMK] (noting that the late Senator Ted Stevens’s “‘tubes’ speech remains infamous”). But see
ANDREW BLUM, TUBES: A JOURNEY TO THE CENTER OF THE INTERNET 5 (2012) (describing
the interconnectedness of the Internet as “a series of tubes”).
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threatened to do so.10 Recently, NOOK announced the shutdown of its service
in the UK, while assuring purchasers that they should “have continued access
to the vast majority of [their] purchased NOOK Books at no new cost.”11 As we
explain more fully below, the switch to a digital platform offers convenience, but
it also makes consumer access more contingent. Unlike a purchase at a bookstore,
a digital media transaction is continuous, linking buyer and seller, and giving the
seller post-transaction power that would be impossible in physical markets.
Permanent possession is not the only right traditionally associated with
ownership that is at stake in the digital environment. In 2012, reports spread
across the Internet that movie star Bruce Willis planned to file a lawsuit
against Apple over restrictions in the iTunes Terms of Service that prevented
him from leaving his digital music collection to his daughters in the event of
his death.12 Although the story turned out to be a hoax,13 the worries about
what happens to our digital libraries when we die are decidedly real.
The terms of use and end user license agreements (EULAs) associated
with digital media goods typically restrict not only bequeathing those goods
by will, but all manner of transfers. According to those provisions, purchasers
cannot lend media goods; they cannot give them away as gifts; and they
certainly cannot resell them.14 For tangible goods like books, records, and movies,
10 See Matt Buchanan, Five Stores That Hosed Customers with DRM, GIZMODO (Apr. 28, 2008,
12:15 PM), http://gizmodo.com/384741/five-stores-that-hosed-customers-with-drm [https://perma.cc/
RLX8-LKJ2] (reporting on the cessation of digital media services by Major League Baseball, Google,
Sony, Virgin Digital, and Microsoft); Antone Gonsalves, Wal-Mart Reverses Decision to Shutdown
Digital Music DRM Servers, INFORMATIONWEEK (Oct. 10, 2008, 5:41 PM), http://www.informationweek.
com/wal-mart-reverses-decision-to-shutdown-digital-music-drm-servers-/d/d-id/1072848 [https://perma.
cc/N4U6-UFUT] (describing Wal-Mart’s reversal of its decision to shut down its digital music servers
due to negative customer feedback); Jon Healey, Yahoo Pulls an MSN Music (Only Faster), L.A. TIMES:
BIT PLAYER (July 23, 2008), http://opinion.latimes.com/bitplayer/2008/07/yahoo-pull-and.html [https://
perma.cc/82QJ-UBKN] (describing how customers were unable to access their online music after Yahoo
shut down its digital media service); see also Julie Jacobson, Perils of DRM: What Happens to Your Digital
Content if the Provider Goes Out of Business?, CE PRO (June 5, 2009), http://www.cepro.com/article
/print/what_happens_to_your_digital_content_if_the_provider_goes_out_of_business/ [https://perma.cc
/6W3E-RDNV] (reporting on issues that companies and consumers have had using digital rights
management (DRM) protection).
11 Notice, The NOOK Team, Important Changes to the NOOK Service, http://www.nook.com
/gb/notice [https://perma.cc/ZM3W-MSLT] (emphasis added).
12 E.g., John Harlow & Robin Henry, It’s iHard as Willis Fights Apple, SUNDAY TIMES (Sept. 2,
2012), http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/Tech/article1117103.ece [https://perma.cc/FJ8
7-QH7A] (reporting on Bruce Willis’s desire to establish a trust in order to leave his digital music
collection to his daughters).
13 See Charles Arthur, No, Bruce Willis Isn’t Suing Apple over iTunes Rights, GUARDIAN: APPLE
TECH. BLOG (Sept. 3, 2012, 5:29 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/blog/2012/sep/03/
no-apple-bruce-willis [https://perma.cc/J7ET-DFPR] (refuting the claim that Bruce Willis planned
to sue Apple over ownership of his music collection).
14 For example, Amazon’s terms for Kindle ebooks include the following provision, “Unless
specifically indicated otherwise, you may not sell, rent, lease, distribute, broadcast, sublicense, or
otherwise assign any rights to the Kindle Content . . . .” Kindle Store Terms of Use, AMAZON, http://
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copyright law’s first sale doctrine guarantees owners the right to transfer them as
they see fit.15 But copyright holders and digital retailers argue that digital goods
are different for two reasons. First, transfer of a digital file typically requires the
creation of a new copy.16 Second, rights holders and retailers maintain that digital
media goods are not sold to purchasers; they are merely licensed.17

www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201014950 [https://perma.cc/FA55-C7T4] (last
updated Mar. 15, 2016). Similarly, Amazon’s MP3 store terms state that “you may not redistribute,
transmit, assign, sell, broadcast, rent, share, lend, modify, adapt, edit, license or otherwise transfer or
use Purchased Music.” Amazon Music Terms of Use, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer
/display.html?nodeId=201380010 [https://perma.cc/HW7P-KFEH] (last updated Apr. 12, 2016). Apple’s
App Store terms provide, “You may not transfer, redistribute or sublicense the Licensed Application
and, if you sell your Apple Device to a third party, you must remove the Licensed Application from
the Apple Device before doing so . . . . You agree not to modify, rent, loan, sell, or distribute the
Services or Content in any manner, and you shall not exploit the Services in any manner not expressly
authorized.” Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/legal/internetservices/itunes/us/terms.html [https://perma.cc/66BZ-42L3] (last updated Sept. 13, 2016).
15 See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2012) (“[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made
under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.”); see
also Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013) (describing the first sale rule
as “a common-law doctrine with an impeccable historic pedigree”). The statutory first sale rule
imposes some restrictions on the commercial rental, leasing, and lending of copies of sound
recordings and computer programs. See id. § 109(b) (describing the circumstances in which the
renting, leasing, and lending of certain media are restricted, such as for the purpose of direct or
indirect commercial advantage).
16 See Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889, 901 (2011)
(noting how “the benefits of first sale have traditionally depended on a single trigger: ownership of a
copy of a work”).
17 See, e.g., Kindle Store Terms of Use, supra note 14 (“Kindle Content is licensed, not sold, to you
by the Content Provider.”); Terms of Service and User Agreement, SONY PLAYSTATION NETWORK,
https://www.playstation.com/en-us/network/legal/terms-of-service/ [https://perma.cc/PDV9-DYVV] (“[A]ll
content and software . . . are licensed non-exclusively and revocably to you . . . solely for Your
personal, private, non-transferable, non-commercial, limited use on a limited number of Authorized
Devices in the country in which your account is registered . . . . You may not sell, rent, lease, loan,
sublicense, modify, adapt, arrange, translate, reverse engineer, decompile, or disassemble any portion
of the Property.”). Apple is somewhat less clear in how it characterizes iTunes transactions. After
informing consumers that its “[s]tandard EULA will govern any content . . . purchased” and noting
that “[a]ll [t]ransactions are final,” Apple insists that consumers agree not to “modify, rent, loan, sell,
or distribute” their purchases. Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions, supra note 14; see also
Amazon Music Terms of Use, supra note 14 (“[A]ll sales are final and risk of loss transfers upon sale.”).
The choice to avoid the “licensed, not sold” language in the music context is presumably a function
of recording contracts that entitle artists to significantly higher royalty rates for licenses in
comparison to royalties on sales. See F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958, 96465 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that “the differences between [a license and a sale] play an important role
in the overall structure and policies that govern artistic rights”); Eriq Gardner, Universal Music
Settling Big Class Action Lawsuit over Digital Royalties (Exclusive), HOLLYWOOD REP. (Mar. 19, 2015,
1:51 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/universal-music-settling-big-class-783096 [https://
perma.cc/64MB-XAAF] (reporting that artists receive fifteen percent of download income based on
“sales” versus fifty percent for “licenses”).
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While lawyers might comprehend the difference between a license and a
traditional sale, there are good reasons to doubt that the average consumer
appreciates this distinction. The overwhelming majority of online shoppers
ignore license terms.18 It is not hard to understand why. Licenses are
notoriously long and complex. Although Apple has recently trimmed them
down, the iTunes Terms and Conditions were once over 19,000 words—longer
than Shakespeare’s Macbeth.19 And these licenses are overflowing with defined
terms, technical jargon, legalese, and complex sentence structures.20 Given their
complexity and ubiquity, it is only a slight exaggeration to claim that if consumers
were to read every license agreement they encountered, the economy would grind
to a halt.21 So it is no surprise that most people—including the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court22—choose to ignore licenses, particularly when making a
ninety-nine cent purchase from iTunes or Amazon.23
18 See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the Recommendations
of the ALI’s “Principles of the Law of Software Contracts,” 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 179-81 (2011) (reporting
empirical data supporting the conclusion that license terms “are almost always ignored”); see also
Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard Form Contracts 22
(N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 195, 2013), http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1199&context=nyu_lewp [https://perma.cc/DDP2-R6UZ] (finding that license agreements for
software retailers were accessed by users only 0.05% of the time). Our own results show a slightly higher
rate of 1.4%. See infra text accompanying note 75. The common distinction between licenses and sales
ignores the fact that a license to make use of a work may be accompanied by a sale, lease, or other transfer
of a copy of that work. See Lothar Determann & Aaron Xavier Fellmet, Don’t Judge a Sale by Its License:
Software Transfers Under the First Sale Doctrine in the United States and the European Community, 36 U. S.F.
L. REV. 1, 11 (2001) (discussing “critical” distinctions between “carrier media and protected intellectual
property” as well as “the intellectual property itself . . . and the right to use or copy” that material).
19 Tom Gardner, To Read, or Not to Read . . . the Terms and Conditions, DAILY MAIL (Mar. 22,
2012, 11:00 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2118688/PayPal-agreement-longer-HamletiTunes-beats-Macbeth.html [https://perma.cc/FV5F-RZ83].
20 Indeed, many licenses require a postgraduate education to fully understand. See DOUGLAS E.
PHILLIPS, THE SOFTWARE LICENSE UNVEILED: HOW LEGISLATION BY LICENSE CONTROLS SOFTWARE
ACCESS 77 (2009) (using the Flesch-Kincaid readability formula to analyze an Adobe licensing agreement
and finding that a reader would likely need at least 19.3 years of formal education in order to decipher it).
21 To take a single example, Adobe Flash is a software platform that is downloaded
approximately eight million times each day. See Bob Dormon, Adobe Demands 7,000 Years a Day from
Humankind, REGISTER (Dec. 4, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/12/04/feature_
tech_licences_are_daft [https://perma.cc/PKJ2-C9DS] (noting the software company’s reported daily
downloads). Assuming the average user can read the software’s 3500-word license in ten minutes, if
everyone who installed Flash in a single day read the license, it would require collectively over 1500
years of human attention per day. Id.
22 See Debra Cassens Weiss, Chief Justice Roberts Admits He Doesn’t Read the Computer Fine Print,
A.B.A. J. (Oct. 20, 2010, 12:17 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chief_justice_roberts_
admits_he_doesnt_read_the_computer_fine_print/ [https://perma.cc/WKL4-2KR4] (“Answering a
student question, Roberts admitted he doesn’t usually read the computer jargon that is a condition
of accessing websites . . . .”).
23 Because licenses create idiosyncratic bundles of rights, a consumer would have to investigate
the details of each transaction in order to be informed of the material differences between them. As
a result, licenses impose significant information costs on consumers. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill &
Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110
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If they do not read the terms, how well do consumers understand the
choices they are making when they choose ebooks over hardcovers, MP3s over
CDs and vinyl, or movie downloads over Blu-ray discs? Perhaps consumers
think that the terms do not contain important limits, or that the convenience
of immediate gratification outweighs any limits imposed. Most consumers are
operating on the basis of incomplete information. Moreover, they may wrongly
assume that the unread, and thus, unknown terms in license agreements are
more favorable than they are in fact. Recent work by Ian Ayres and Alan Schwartz
suggests that many consumers suffer from “term optimism”—the tendency to
“expect a contract to contain more favorable terms than it actually provides.”24
For example, consumers might anticipate that unread terms allow them to lend
their ebooks to friends and family. Beyond this baseline optimism bias, the
likelihood that consumers will act on the basis of the mistaken belief that license
terms grant them greater rights than they actually do might be exacerbated by
marketing language that sends a signal inconsistent with the fine print.
Some commentators have expressed concern that consumers might be
misled by the apparent disconnect between the message communicated by
the Buy Now button and the limited set of rights contemplated by EULAs
and terms of service.25 If so, the apparent embrace of digital goods may not
accurately reflect consumer preferences. But industry representatives have
been more sanguine, insisting that consumers have a more nuanced and
sophisticated understanding of these transactions.26
YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2000) (“[T]here is a potentially infinite range of promises that the law will honor.”);
see also Christina Mulligan, A Numerus Clausus Principle for Intellectual Property, 80 TENN. L. REV.
235, 248 (2013) (discussing how “[e]very in rem right imposes information costs on a large and
indefinite class of people”).
24 See Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN.
L. REV. 545, 551 (2014).
25 See DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, WHITE PAPER ON REMIXES,
FIRST SALE, AND STATUTORY DAMAGES 56-57 (2016) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER ON REMIXES],
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/copyrightwhitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/KV9YW6JQ] (noting commentators’ concern that “consumers expect that when they click on the [Buy Now]
button, they will ‘own’ the copy”); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Reconciling Intellectual and Personal
Property, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1211, 1257 (2015) (noting the potential for consumer misunderstanding
as a result of the Buy Now button).
26 See WHITE PAPER ON REMIXES, supra note 25, at 56 n.352 (quoting Ben Sheffner of the
Motion Picture Association of America as stating, “If you ask people when you go to a site to buy a
movie or a book or a song, I think they pretty much understand that you’re not actually buying the
copyright. What you are doing is you’re purchasing or buying a license which permits you to do certain
things” and K. Christopher Branch of KC Branch Firm as stating, “I’m not sure that the consumers
have the expectation that when they hit the buy button for some music that they’re thinking about how
they’re going to resell it . . . .”); see also DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, GREEN
PAPER ROUNDTABLE ON COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL
ECONOMY 156 (2014), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ip/global/copyrights/la_transcript.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EG9A-H7BE] (quoting Catherine Bridge of Disney as stating, “I haven’t done a
survey[.] I can’t speak scientifically about this, but . . . I would just say that I don’t think use of the buy
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In its recent White Paper on Remixes, First Sale, and Statutory Damages, the
Department of Commerce noted that the “the record before [it] [wa]s devoid
of any actual evidence as to what consumers understand when they click on
the ‘buy’ button.”27 Nonetheless, it expressed concern over consumers’
understanding of their ownership rights in the online context:
It does not appear that consumers have a clear understanding whether they own
or license the products and services they purchase online due in part to the length
and opacity of most EULAs, the labelling of the “buy” button, and the lack of
clear and conspicuous information regarding ownership status on websites.28

Why might consumers be misled? Consumers operate in the marketplace
based on their prior experience.29 We suggest that consumers’ “default”
behavior is based on the experience of buying physical media and that the
assumptions from that context have carried over into the digital domain. As the
above quote from Jeff Bezos reminds us, “[e]veryone understands” that when
they buy a book, record, or movie, they can resell it, lend it, or give it away.30
And the familiar Buy Now button leverages that common understanding.
This Article presents the results of the first study of the impact of
marketing language like the Buy Now button on the beliefs and behavior of
digital media consumers. Our data demonstrate that a sizable percentage of
consumers is misled with respect to the rights they acquire when they “buy”
digital media goods. They mistakenly believe they can keep those goods
permanently, lend them to friends and family, give them as gifts, leave them
in their wills, resell them, and use them on their devices of choice.
Not only are consumers misled, they are misled about ownership rights
that are important to them. A sizable percentage of consumers express a
desire for those rights and many say they are willing to pay more to preserve
them. Importantly for retailers and copyright holders, respondents in our
study indicated that they would turn to streaming services and BitTorrent if
they were unable to engage in the uses typically associated with personal
property ownership.
Part I of this Article describes the current digital media marketplace. Part II
describes the methods of our study. Part III details the results and offers a number
of hypotheses to explain them. Part IV considers these results through the lens of
button is a deception, and I think . . . that people are consuming content are understanding that it’s not
a physical ownership model.”).
27 WHITE PAPER ON REMIXES, supra note 25, at 68.
28 Id.
29 See Manoj Hastak & Michael Mazis, Deception by Implication: A Typology of Truthful but
Misleading Advertising and Labeling Claims, J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING, Fall 2011, at 157, 158-59
(discussing “schema” theory).
30 O’Reilly, supra note 1.
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false and deceptive advertising law. The Article concludes by considering the
implications of the study on other segments of the digital economy.
I. THE DIGITAL MEDIA MARKETPLACE
The market for media goods has undergone rapid and significant changes
in recent years. For decades, if not centuries, copyright holders monetized their
works primarily through the sale of tangible copies—hardcover books, CDs,
records, sheet music, Blu-ray movies, DVDs, and, before that, VHS tapes. But
the emergence of the Internet, coupled with mobile computing technology, led
to a rethinking of media distribution. Pressing plants, delivery trucks, and shelf
space have largely been replaced by servers, data plans, and disk space. This
shift has dramatically affected the relationship between consumers and the media
goods they acquire. At the same time, it has introduced considerable ambiguity
about the nature of the transactions that make up the digital marketplace.
A. From Physical to Digital
In the wake of Napster,31 the music industry felt pressure to establish some
means for lawful access to digital music. After a couple of failed attempts by
the industry,32 Apple launched the iTunes Music Store in 2003.33 Within a
decade, iTunes boasted a library of forty-three million tracks that had been
downloaded thirty-five billion times, making Apple the largest music retailer
in the world—no doubt in part because of Apple’s dominance in the media player
hardware market.34 Soon paid music downloads surpassed physical media sales.
A similar trend played itself out in the world of books, with a dominant hardware31 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Through a
process commonly called ‘peer-to-peer’ file sharing, Napster allows its users to: (1) make MP3 music
files stored on individual computer hard drives available for copying by other Napster users; (2)
search for MP3 music files stored on other users’ computers; and (3) transfer exact copies of the
contents of other users’ MP3 files from one computer to another via the Internet.”).
32 See WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 8-10 (2009) (describing
the failure of the major label-backed Pressplay and MusicNet services).
33 See Nathan Ingraham, iTunes Store at 10: How Apple Built a Digital Media Juggernaut, VERGE
(Apr. 26, 2013, 11:56 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/4/26/4265172/itunes-store-at-10-how-applebuilt-a-digital-media-juggernaut [https://perma.cc/3MS4-7PPV] (reporting on the tenth anniversary of
the launch of the iTunes Music Store).
34 See ITUNES, http://www.apple.com/itunes/music [https://perma.cc/9C26-3TZF] (advertising
that the iTunes store has forty-three million songs for sale); Jordan Kahn, Eddy Cue: Apple Passed 35
Billions Songs Sold on iTunes Last Week, 40 Million iTunes Radio Listeners, 9TO5MAC (May 28,
2014), http://9to5mac.com/2014/05/28/eddy-cue-apple-passed-35-billions-songs-sold-on-itunes-last-week
-40-million-itunes-radio-listeners [https://perma.cc/U573-MN8X] (noting that Apple has sold more than
thirty-five billion songs); see also Press Release, Apple, iTunes Store Top Music Retailer in the US (Apr.
3, 2008), https://www.apple.com/pr/library/2008/04/03iTunes-Store-Top-Music-Retailer-in-the-US.html
[https://perma.cc/FH7U-LCMH] (announcing that iTunes “became the largest music retailer in the
US based on the amount of music sold during January and February 2008”).
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maker driving explosive growth in the sale of digital media. After Amazon
released the Kindle, annual ebook sales increased from ten million in 2008 to 510
million in 2014, rivaling sales of physical books.35 Likewise, paid software and
video game downloads have come to rival or even surpass physical sales.36
Initially, consumers downloaded their digital purchases and stored copies
locally. But as smartphones replaced dedicated media playback devices like
the iPod, and as high speed mobile data networks matured, sellers encouraged
consumers to store media on the provider’s cloud network.37 Since those files
may not be stored permanently on a user’s device, continued possession and
access is less certain.38 The lack of physical possession means that consumers’
access to their purchases is contingent on the cloud service provider. Apple,
for example, has removed purchased albums from consumers’ iTunes cloud
accounts at the request of copyright holders.39 If the consumer did not save a
35 See Marisa Bluestone, U.S. Publishing Industry’s Annual Survey Reveals $28 Billion in Revenue in
2014, ASS’N AM. PUB. (June 10, 2015), http://publishers.org/news/us-publishing-industry’s-annual-surveyreveals-28-billion-revenue-201 [https://perma.cc/4F2W-MQVT] (noting that ebook sales reached 510
million in 2014); Jim Milliot, BEA 2013: The E-book Boom Years, PUBLISHER’S WKLY. (May 29, 2013),
http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/bea/article/57390-bea-2013-the-e-bookboom-years.html [https://perma.cc/99H2-DSVM] (indicating that ebook sales totaled only ten million
in 2008, the year the Kindle was released). Although sales of ebooks surpassed hardcovers in 2012,
digital sales decreased for the first time ever in 2015, in part because of publisher-driven price
increases. See Alexandra Alter, The Plot Twist: E-Book Sales Slip, and Print Is Far From Dead, N.Y. TIMES,
(Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/23/business/media/the-plot-twist-e-book-sales-slip-andprint-is-far-from-dead.html [https://perma.cc/TN8B-PBHZ] (noting that the Association of American
Publishers reported reduced sales of ebooks and suggesting that physical books are uniquely attractive
to consumers). But see Matthew Ingram, No, E-book Sales Are Not Falling, Despite What Publishers Say,
FORTUNE (Sept. 24, 2015, 1:40 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/09/24/ebook-sales/ [https://perma.cc/
P35U-J87H] (challenging the conclusion that overall ebooks sales declined, citing the impact of
higher prices on sales).
36 See Jacqui Cheng, Forget the Box: Downloads Dominate Online Software Purchases, ARS
TECHNICA (May 28, 2010, 4:26 PM), http://arstechnica.com/software/news/2010/05/forget-the-box-do
wnloads-dominate-online-software-purchases.ars [https://perma.cc/LB7H-J6UR] (indicating that “nearly
two-thirds of online software purchases . . . were digital downloads”); Lance Whitney, Digital Game
Downloads Beat Retail Store Sales, CNET (Sept. 20, 2010, 9:05 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-10797
_3-20016943-235.html [https://perma.cc/4UST-MJVF] (noting that digital PC game sales surpassed retail
game sales in 2010).
37 The “cloud” refers to remote storage, processing, and other computing resources available
to Internet users. Although marketed as a groundbreaking technology, the cloud has its roots in
much older, pre-digital networks. See generally TUNG-HUI HU, A PREHISTORY OF THE CLOUD (2015)
(tracing the history of the cloud to industrial networks such as railroad and sanitation systems).
38 Even when consumers store copies locally, their ability to use them as they choose can be
constrained by DRM technologies.
39 For example, if a copyright holder removes an album from the iTunes Store or replaces it
with a new version of the same album, purchasers are prevented from accessing or downloading the
removed album. See Geoffrey Goetz, Apple’s iCloud Is No Safe Haven for Some iTunes Purchases,
GIGAOM (Sept. 25, 2013, 4:10 PM), https://gigaom.com/2013/09/25/apples-icloud-is-no-safe-havenfor-some-itunes-purchases/ [https://perma.cc/T8W5-CKRH] (recounting how numerous albums
purchased by the author “disappeared from [his] iTunes Match music library”).
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local copy, her purchased music simply vanished. Apple’s terms explicitly
contemplate this scenario: “Apple further reserves the right to modify,
suspend, or discontinue the Services (or any part or Content thereof) at any
time with or without notice to you, and Apple will not be liable to you or to
any third party should it exercise such rights.”40
In recent years, subscription streaming services have exploded in
popularity. Netflix and Hulu launched online video services in 2007.41 Today,
Netflix is one of the most popular content providers on the Internet. The
service has more than seventy-five million subscribers and accounts for a third
of all Internet traffic in North America.42 In 2015, its revenue exceeded $6.7
billion.43 Music streaming services have seen similar growth. Spotify has
seventy-five million active users, about twenty million of whom are paying
subscribers.44 In 2014, the use of streaming services grew by a staggering fiftyfour percent.45 Not surprisingly, the streaming subscription model is being
applied to books, video games, and other media as well.46
The eagerness of consumers to embrace streaming services makes sense.
Streaming services are inexpensive, typically costing around ten dollars per
month. They have massive content libraries,47 while still being convenient,
40 Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions, supra note 14.
41 See Ken Auletta, Outside the Box: Netflix and the Future of Television, NEW YORKER: ANNALS
COMMUN. (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/02/03/outside-the-box-2 [https:

//perma.cc/U59H-PYU6] (noting that Netflix began streaming movies and TV in 2007, the same
year that NBC and Fox launched Hulu).
42 See Victor Luckerson, Netflix Accounts for More Than a Third of All Internet Traffic, TIME (May
29, 2015), http://time.com/3901378/netflix-internet-traffic [https://perma.cc/UGU5-X7D2] (“[N]etflix
now accounts more almost [sic] 37% of downstream Internet traffic in North America during peak evening
hours . . . .”); Ben Popper, Netflix Whizzes Past 75 Million Subscribers Thanks to Record International
Growth, VERGE (Jan. 19, 2016, 4:17 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2016/1/19/10790282/netflix-q4-2015earnings [https://perma.cc/D25P-WJHT] (reporting on the rapid growth in Netflix subscribership).
43 See Netflix Inc., MARKETWATCH, http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/stock/nflx/financials
[https://perma.cc/M6W7-EX2V] (reporting data on Netflix’s sales, including $6.78 billion in 2015).
44 See 20 Million Reasons To Say Thanks, SPOTIFY NEWS (June 10, 2015), https://news.spotify.com/
us/2015/06/10/20-million-reasons-to-say-thanks/ [https://perma.cc/L8S4-8Z8E] (announcing these milestones
in Spotify subscribership).
45 Ethan Smith, Music Downloads Plummet in U.S., but Sales of Vinyl Records and Streaming Surge,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/music-downloads-plummet-in-u-s-but-salesof-vinyl-records-and-streaming-surge-1420092579 [https://perma.cc/WT4U-GJJM].
46 In 2014, Amazon launched Kindle Unlimited, which gives subscribers access to a growing ebook
library for a fixed monthly price. See Hayley Tsukayama, Is Kindle Unlimited Worth It?, WASH. POST (July
18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/07/18/is-kindle-unlimited-worth-it/
[https://perma.cc/T77A-K56Y] (reporting on the launch of the Kindle Unlimited service). Services like
EA Access offer subscriptions to online video game libraries. See Erik Kain, Sony Was Right To Turn Down
EA’s Video Game Subscription Plan [Update], FORBES (July 30, 2014, 2:28 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/erikkain/2014/07/30/sony-was-right-to-turn-down-eas-video-game-subscription-plan/ [https://perma.cc/
2RC9-ZZ2Z] (describing the emergence of gaming subscription services, including EA Access).
47 See Madi Alexander & Ben Sisario, Apple Music, Spotify and a Guide to Music Streaming
Services, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/30/business/media/
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offering portability and compatibility with a range of devices. From the
perspective of copyright holders, there are upsides as well. By moving from
physical to digital distribution, content owners can limit the impact of
secondary markets. They can also bundle old, low-value content with new,
high-value titles.48 Subscription streaming services are also viewed as a
strategy for reducing copyright infringement.49 Given their low price point,
services like Netflix and Spotify can attract consumers who might otherwise
get their movies and music from The Pirate Bay.50
But individual creators have been less than enthusiastic about offering
their content on subscription services. A parade of songwriters and recording
artists have complained about what they say are parsimonious royalty rates.51
Compared to the good old days of record-breaking CD sales, musicians are
seeing checks that are missing several zeroes. In large part, that is because
consumers are not willing to pay as much for temporary access to music as
they are to own copies. The other explanation is that the bulk of the more
than two billion dollars that Spotify has paid in copyright licenses—a figure
representing seventy percent of its revenue—went to record labels.52 Under
music-streaming-guide.html [https://perma.cc/SM95-XHTK] (noting that the Spotify, Google Play,
Tidal, and Apple Music libraries each include more than thirty million tracks); Piotr Kowalczyk, Kindle
Unlimited Ebook Subscription — 9 Things to Know, EBOOK FRIENDLY, http://ebookfriendly.com/kindle
-unlimited-ebook-subscription/ [https://perma.cc/D5MZ-6GV3] (last updated Oct. 27, 2015) (noting
that the Kindle Unlimited library includes over a million books); Michael Liedtke, Gaps in Netflix’s
Online Library Likely to Persist, YAHOO! NEWS (Apr. 9, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/gaps-netflixsonline-library-likely-persist-200620994.html [https://perma.cc/X4HQ-2GB7] (noting that the Netflix
streaming library includes over 60,000 movie and television titles).
48 See Tim Carmody, Netflix-Warner Bros. Deal Bundles Old and New Niche Dramas, VERGE (Jan.
7, 2013, 11:42 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/1/7/3846246/netflix-warner-bros-revolution-west-wing
[https://perma.cc/K8QX-YPF9] (reporting on a Netflix deal with Warner Bros., a continuation of
Netflix’s strategy of “[b]undling hot and not-so-hot series” in one deal to lower costs).
49 See James Titcomb, Internet Piracy Falls to Record Lows Amid Ride of Spotify and Netflix,
TELEGRAPH (July 5, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/07/04/internetpiracy-falls-to-record-lows-amid-rise-of-spotify-and-ne/ [https://perma.cc/X9EY-T7WE] (noting the
“strong link between the rise of [subscription] services and falling piracy” suggested by a report
commissioned by the United Kingdom’s Intellectual Property Office).
50 See Luis Aguiar & Joel Waldfogel, Streaming Reaches Flood Stage: Does Spotify Stimulate or Depress
Music Sales? 20 (European Comm’n Joint Research Ctr., Inst. for Prospective Tech. Studies Dig. Econ.
Working Paper No. 2015/05, 2015), https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/default/files/JRC96951.pdf [https://
perma.cc/PCN4-EJ3G] (analyzing data on “total weekly unpaid consumption on the top-50 weekly
Spotify streaming index” to show that usage of Spotify displaces music piracy).
51 See Zach Schonfeld, What Do Indie Musicians Really Think About Music Streaming?, NEWSWEEK
(July 23, 2015, 8:49 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/ten-indie-musicians-weigh-music-streaming-debate
-355298 [https://perma.cc/Y9UV-3NMD] (identifying a number of artists including Taylor Swift, Thom
Yorke, and Prince, who have criticized Spotify and other streaming services, while noting
considerable differences of opinions among independent recording artists).
52 See Spotify Explained: How We Pay Royalties: An Overview, SPOTIFY: ARTISTS (2013), https://
www.spotifyartists.com/spotify-explained/#how-we-pay-royalties-overview [https://perma.cc/2WQFGLXX] (“We pay out nearly 70% of our total revenue to rights holders.”).
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the recording contracts that labels have with artists, very little of that revenue
made its way to recording artists.53
Perhaps surprisingly, as adoption of streaming services has skyrocketed,
demand for vinyl records, a decidedly analog format, has surged as well. In
2014, vinyl sales increased more than fifty percent over the prior year.54 The
same held true in 2015.55 Vinyl is generally the most expensive way to get new
music, but it offers arguably higher fidelity and better packaging. Importantly,
it also confers to buyers the full range of property interests traditionally
associated with a purchase.
B. Mixed Messages for Consumers
The concurrent rise in popularity of these two means of acquiring
music—subscription streaming and vinyl records—highlights the importance
of consumer choice. Some consumers prefer low-cost temporary access, and
others prefer high-cost permanent access. For any particular consumer, those
preferences can vary over time, across media types, and between particular
artists or titles. When it comes to the stark choice between streaming and
vinyl, it is easy for consumers to gather the information necessary to
formulate and exercise those preferences. Significant price differences, the
requirement of ongoing payment for subscriptions, and the presence or
absence of a physical artifact are all salient features of a transaction that help
consumers distinguish between these two models. But in other parts of the
digital economy, the lines are much less clear.
Elsewhere, consumers are confronted with marketing language that appears
to be in tension with the text of the licenses associated with those transactions.
A consumer browsing digital movies on the Apple iTunes store, for example,
might see an ad inviting them to “Own It in HD.”56 But what does it mean to
Apple and to consumers to “own” a digital movie? If Apple’s terminology draws
53 See Tim Ingham, Major Labels Keep 73% of Spotify Premium Payouts – Report, MUSIC BUS.
WORLDWIDE (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/artists-get-7-of-streaming-cash
-labels-take-46/ [https://perma.cc/3XBQ-4ZSV] (citing an Ernst & Young study that revealed that
record labels kept 73% of payments from streaming services, while songwriters and recording artists
collected just 16% and 11% of those payments, respectively).
54 See Keith Caulfield, Vinyl Album Sales Hit Historic High in 2014, Again, BILLBOARD (Dec. 31,
2014), http://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/chart-beat/6422442/vinyl-album-sales-hit-historic-high
-2014 [https://perma.cc/C2GZ-P8BU] (“Sales of [vinyl albums] grew by 52 percent in 2014 to 9.2
million copies (up from 6.1 million in 2013).”). In absolute terms, the number was 9.2 million units,
the largest vinyl tally in decades. Id.
55 See JOSHUA P. FRIEDLANDER, RECORDING INDUS. ASS’N OF AM., NEWS AND NOTES
ON 2015 MID-YEAR RIAA SHIPMENT AND REVENUE STATISTICS (2015), http://www.riaa.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/2015_RIAAMidYear_ShipmentData.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8GX-CPUP]
(“Vinyl was up 52% by value for the first half of the year.”).
56 See Movies, ITUNES (offering consumers the option to “Own It in HD”).

328

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 165: 315

on a frame of reference established by consumers’ experience with physical
products, Apple’s message is inconsistent with the terms for its digital products.
The license maintains that consumers may not “modify, rent, loan, sell, or
distribute” the movies and music they acquire from iTunes.57 Likewise,
Amazon urges its customers to Buy Now for both physical objects and digital
files.58 But Amazon’s terms for digital goods reveal similar restrictions for
digital goods that do not encumber their physical counterparts.59
In some instances, ownership is touted as an explicit selling point of
digital content. When publisher Image Comics announced a digital storefront
for comic books, it distinguished itself from competitors by claiming that its
customers actually owned their downloads.60 As Image’s Director of Business
Development explained at the time, “There’s something to be said for the
ownership factor. If readers purchase a book on [a competitor’s service], . . .
that could be revoked. And God forbid, if [the competitor] goes under or
their data center has an earthquake all their hard drives go away—then you’ve
got nothing.”61 However, despite making promises of ownership, Image
Comics’s terms were in line with other digital retailers that offer a license
instead of ownership:
You shall not share, lend, lease, rent, sell, license, sublicense, transfer, network,
reproduce, display, distribute, or otherwise make any Digital Comic available
to any other person, to the extent that doing so requires making a copy of the
Digital Comic (e.g., a copy on a hard drive, RAM, flash memory, a paper copy,
etc.). A Digital Comic may be shared only by sharing the device containing
the Digital Comic.62

Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions, supra note 14.
See Guardians of the Galaxy (Theatrical), AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/Guardians-GalaxyTheatrical-Chris-Pratt/dp/B00QROH0QK/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1481933738&sr=8-1&keywords=
guardians+of+the+galaxy [https://perma.cc/487M-PB2W] (offering consumers the option to “Rent
Movie HD” or “Buy Movie HD”).
59 For example, Amazon provides that “[u]nless specifically indicated otherwise, [customers]
may not sell, rent, lease, [or] distribute . . . any rights to the Kindle Content.” Kindle Store Terms of
Use, supra note 14. Amazon’s MP3 store offers similar terms. Although Amazon customers “purchase”
music, payment merely “grant[s] [customers] a non-exclusive, non-transferable right to use Purchased
Music . . . only for [customers’] personal, non-commercial purposes . . . . [Further, customers] may not
redistribute, . . . sell, . . . rent, share, lend, . . . or otherwise transfer or use Purchased Music . . . .”
Amazon Music Terms of Use, supra note 14.
60 See Laura Hudson, For the First Time, You Can Actually Own the Digital Comics You Buy, WIRED:
CULTURE (July 2, 2013, 2:52 PM), http://www.wired.com/2013/07/drm-free-comics-download-image/
[https://perma.cc/3GNV-JR5K] (reporting that Image Comics would be the “first major U.S.
publisher” to allow consumers to download DRM-free comics to their hard drives).
61 Id.
62 Terms and Conditions, IMAGE COMICS, https://imagecomics.com/about/terms-and-conditions
[https://perma.cc/TFL3-XJGZ].
57
58
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These conflicts between advertising and legal terms are not limited to the
mass market. HeinOnline offers a massive database of legal publications,
including law journals, judicial opinions, statutes, and treaties from around
the world on a subscription basis. In recent years, HeinOnline introduced
Digital Ownership Program, a new way to access its content. As HeinOnline
explains the program, by “purchasing digital ownership,” users can “obtain
ownership rights to PDF files” delivered on a hard drive.63 However, the
terms of service for the Digital Ownership Program, which are not available
for review on the HeinOnline website, prohibit “owners” of those files from
transferring them.64 So a library would not be allowed, for example, to loan
or give its hard drive to another institution.65
Sophisticated institutional consumers like libraries will often be capable
of reconciling marketing terms like “buy” and “own” with the more complex
picture revealed by license terms.66 But it remains to be seen, however, whether
and to what extent the average consumer is getting what she bargained for.

63 Digital Ownership, HEINONLINE: SERVICES, http://home.heinonline.org/services/ownership/
[https://perma.cc/DK62-558M].
64 Those terms provide in relevant part that “[c]ustomer[s] may not: (i) sell, distribute, publicly
display or in any other way exploit (commercially or otherwise) the Collection(s) or portions thereof,
by any means, including, without limitation, sale, exchange, barter, transfer, assignment, or
distribution, (ii) transfer, assign or sublicense any of the Customer’s rights or obligations under this
Agreement.” Email from HeinOnline to Aaron Perzanowski, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve
Univ. Sch. of Law (Jan. 13, 2015, 4:18 PM) (on file with author).
65 Random House used similar language when its Vice President of Library and Academic
Marketing and Sales told Library Journal, “Random House’s often repeated, and always consistent
position is this: when libraries buy their RH, Inc. ebooks from authorized library wholesalers, it is
our position that they own them.” Michael Kelley, Random House Says Libraries Own Their Ebooks,
LIBR. J.: LJ INSIDER (Oct. 18, 2012, 2:36 PM), http://lj.libraryjournal.com/2012/10/opinion/randomhouse-says-libraries-own-their-ebooks-lj-insider [https://perma.cc/DP58-T93P]. Random House later
clarified that by “owning,” it meant that libraries could move the books they license between
competing DRM-protected ebook vendors like Overdrive. See Mike Masnick, Turns Out When
Random House Said Libraries ‘Own’ Their Ebooks, It Meant, ‘No, They Don’t Own Them,’ TECHDIRT
(Oct. 24, 2012, 12:44 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20121023/23465120806/turns-out-whenrandom-house-said-libraries-own-their-ebooks-it-meant-no-they-dont-own-them.shtml [https://perma.
cc/AW8P-R7RG] (“In fact, at best, when they say ‘own’ they mean ‘if you fit into this limited category,
you have the right to move your ebooks from one approved platform to another approved platform.’”).
66 We do not mean to concede here that licenses necessarily dictate the rights of consumers.
Some courts have recognized that purported license terms do not necessarily preclude sales. See, e.g.,
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that “there [was] no
evidence to support a conclusion that licenses were established under the terms of the promotional
statement” because the record was “devoid of any indication that the recipients agreed to a license”);
Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 121, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2005) (concluding that the language of
Section 117(a), which “allows the owner of a copy of a computer program to copy or modify the
program for limited purposes without incurring liability for infringement,” suggests that the
protection extends beyond those possessing formal title).
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II. METHODS: THE MEDIASHOP STUDY
In order to assess consumer understanding of rights in different kinds of
media, we conducted a web-based survey of a sample of internet users (N=1299)
in 2016.67 The sample was representative of the United States population with
respect to sex, age, and income as measured by 2010 census data.68 In addition,
we collected demographic information on race,69 geographic region,70 and
education level.71 Our panel of respondents was drawn from an initial pool of
7150 Internet users who were invited to participate in our survey. From that
initial solicitation, 2325 participants began the survey. Out of that group, 1299
successfully completed the survey instrument.72
67 The survey was administered using the internet survey platform Qualtrics. We are aware of
the methodological limitations involved in using web-based surveys and that telephone-based surveys
remain the “gold standard.” However, for this study, a web-delivery mechanism was more appropriate
because it allowed us to present the respondent with realistic simulations of the online shopping
experience and because only Internet users can buy media from digital platforms like those studied here.
68 Our sample was 51% female and 49% male. We limited respondents to this binary choice to
mirror the 2010 census. In terms of age, 11.3% of our sample was between the ages of 18–24, 35% was
between 25–44, 35% was between 45–64, and 18% of respondents were 65 or older. This closely
matches the U.S. population as of 2010. See LINDSAY M. HOWDEN & JULIE A. MEYER, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 2010 CENSUS BRIEFS NO. C2010BR-03, AGE AND
SEX COMPOSITION: 2010, at 2 tbl.1 (2011), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-03.
pdf [https://perma.cc/Z792-HQVW] (showing the age and sex breakdown of the U.S. population).
69 Our sample was also roughly representative of the U.S. population with respect to race.
Whites were slightly overrepresented, comprising 80% of our sample. Black and Latino respondents
were underrepresented at 9% and 6% of our sample, respectively. Asian and Native American
respondents made up 4.2% and 0.6% of our sample, respectively, figures roughly in line with national
figures. See KAREN R. HUMES ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 2010
CENSUS BRIEFS NO. C2010BR-02, OVERVIEW OF RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 2010, at 7 tbl.3
(2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/99EH-MAY2]
(showing the racial breakdown of the U.S. population). However, we saw no significant relationship
between race and survey responses.
70 Regionally, our sample included a representative number of Southerners and
Midwesterners. But Northeasterners were overrepresented—roughly 27% in our sample versus 18%
in the population—while Westerners were somewhat underrepresented, comprising 15% of our
sample versus 23% of the population. See PAUL MACKUN & STEVEN WILSON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 2010 CENSUS BRIEFS NO. C2010BR-01, POPULATION DISTRIBUTION
AND CHANGE: 2000 TO 2010, at 2 tbl.1 (2011), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br01.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NZT-4QT4] (showing the geographic breakdown of the U.S. population).
However, we saw no significant correlation between region and survey responses.
71 We asked respondents to report the highest level of education they had completed. They
responded as follows: Less than High School, 2%; High School/GED, 22%; Some College, 28%; 2year College Degree, 11%; 4-year College Degree, 25%; Masters Degree, 10%; Doctoral Degree, 1%;
Professional Degree (e.g., JD, MD), 1%. These results roughly match 2009 U.S. Census data. See
CAMILLE L. RYAN & JULIE SIEBENS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS NO. P20-566, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2009, at 6 tbl.1 (2012), https://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p20-566.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Y4NX-MH59] (reporting educational attainment data for Americans over the age of twenty-five).
72 Most of the other 1026 responses were excluded for failing to meet our demographic criteria;
incomplete responses were also excluded.
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In addition to demographic questions, we asked a series of screening
questions to limit respondents to those who were in the market for digital
books, music, or movies.73 We posed three questions to respondents:
1. Have you paid for digital music in the past 12 months, or do you plan to do
so in the next 12 months?
2. Have you paid for an ebook in the past 12 months, or do you plan to do so
in the next 12 months?
3. Have you paid for digital movies in the past 12 months, or do you plan to
do so in the next 12 months?

The order of these questions was randomized for each participant. As
soon as a respondent answered “Yes” to one of the questions, the participant
was placed in the corresponding group: music, books, or movies. Respondents
who answered “No” to all three questions were disqualified from the survey.
The size of each media group was capped to yield equally-sized groups of 433
respondents for each of books, music, and movies.
Next, we prompted respondents to select a particular media title. Most
surveys test products chosen by the researcher. Instead, we showed
respondents within each media category a number of specific titles and asked
them to choose the one that interested them most. We selected these titles
from Amazon’s then-current list of best sellers and attempted to offer a
diverse cross-section of genres.74 This process allowed us to more closely
replicate marketplace conditions and increase respondent engagement.
A. The MediaShop Site
To test how respondents react to a Buy Now button, we created a fictional
online commerce site called MediaShop. The MediaShop site features design
elements familiar to Internet shoppers—a header with a search bar, navigation
elements, a shopping cart, a product image, a product description, user ratings,
the price of the good, and some mechanism for completing the transaction.
In arranging these various elements, as seen in Figure 1 below, we modeled
MediaShop on existing online retail sites like Amazon, Target, and Walmart.
73 Our study focused on digital music, books, and videos, but similar tensions surrounding user
rights arise in software products such as games and apps as well. For more information, see Lothar
Determann and David Nimmer, Software Copyright’s Oracle from the Cloud, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
161 (2015), which discusses copyright law in the software context.
74 For books, respondents were given a choice between: Bum Rap by Paul Levine, The Girl on the
Train by Paula Hawkins, The Martian by Andy Weir, and All the Light We Cannot See by Anthony Doerr.
For music, the choices were: 1989 by Taylor Swift, Before This World by James Taylor, American
Beauty/American Psycho by Fall Out Boy, and To Pimp a Butterfly by Kendrick Lamar. And for movies,
choices included: Kingsman: The Secret Service, The Imitation Game, Pitch Perfect, and Guardians of the Galaxy.
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After selecting a particular title, each respondent was then shown one of
four product page variations. Those variations differed with regard to both the
type of product displayed and the button used to complete the transaction. For
three of the four variations, respondents saw digital goods—ebooks, MP3s, or
movie downloads—with three different transaction labels (n=970).
Some respondents saw digital goods with the Buy Now button (Figure 2,
n=333); others saw a License Now button (Figure 3, n=310); and a third group saw
a short notice that enumerated the uses that respondents could and could not
make of the digital media good if purchased (Figure 4, n=327). For the fourth
variation, respondents saw a physical good—paperbacks, CDs, or Blu-ray discs—
and the standard Buy Now button (Figure 13, n=329). Roughly equal numbers of
respondents were presented with each of these four product page variations.
Next, respondents were instructed to review that page as they normally
would when acquiring media goods online. Notably, each digital good product
page included a link to the MediaShop Terms of Use, which fully described the
restrictions on the good’s use and transfer. Of the 970 respondents who viewed
the product pages, only fourteen clicked on the Terms of Use link, a rate of 1.4%.75

75 The language of the MediaShop Terms of Use was based on Amazon’s Kindle Store terms.
See Kindle Store Terms of Use, supra note 14.
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Figure 1

Respondents were presented with a range of products to choose from. This image depicts an
ebook paired with the Buy Now button.
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Figure 2

Figure 4

A quarter of respondents were presented
with a Buy Now button paired with a digital
good. Another quarter were presented with a
Buy Now button paired with a tangible good.

Figure 3

A quarter of respondents were presented
with a License Now button paired with a
digital good.
A quarter of respondents were presented
with this short notice concerning rights in
digital goods.

B. Assessing Consumer Understanding of Rights
After respondents viewed the product page, we asked them a series of
questions concerning their understanding of the Buy Now, License Now, or
short notice conditions, as well as their beliefs about the rights they had
acquired by paying for the media good. We began with open-ended questions
such as, “When you see the phrase Buy Now, what, if anything, does it mean
to you?” Next, we posed a set of more specific closed-ended questions. We
asked respondents who viewed a book, for example, whether—after clicking
the appropriate button—they owned the book, could lend it to a friend, could
resell it, could read it on the device of their choice, could leave it to a friend or
family member in their will, could keep it for as long as they wanted, could give
it as a gift, or could make copies of it for others. We posed slightly modified
versions of each of these questions for each media type. Respondents could
choose “Yes,” “No,” or “I don’t know.”76 Most of these questions were designed
76 We included the following instruction: “If you aren’t certain, make the best selection based
on the information you have. If you cannot make an informed choice, select ‘I don’t know.’” In part,
we included this instruction to reduce the risk of “satisficing,” a strategy of choosing the answer that
most reduces the burden of responding. See Jon A. Krosnick et al., Satisficing in Surveys: Initial
Evidence, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR EVALUATION, Summer 1996, at 29, 30-31 (suggesting that fatigue
and work avoidance behaviors in survey respondents can impact results and data quality).
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to gauge the degree to which respondents believed they were entitled to engage
in particular behaviors. However, we asked whether respondents “own” the
media good as a measure of their overall impression of the transaction.
C. Assessing Whether Rights Matter to Consumers
For three particular behaviors—lending, reselling, and using the device of
the consumer’s choice—we posed a set of follow-up questions designed to
measure the degree to which respondents valued those rights and the degree to
which their presence or absence influences purchasing decisions.77 We began by
asking respondents to state their preference for media goods on the basis of these
behaviors on a five-point scale. Next, we asked respondents how much more, if
anything, they would be willing to spend for a media good that could be used in
the manner described—lent, resold, or used on the device of the respondent’s
choice. These questions were intended to determine the extent to which
respondents’ stated preferences would translate into behavior in the marketplace.
Finally, we gathered data intended to reveal the impact of the ability to
engage in these three behaviors on the means by which respondents would
acquire or access copyrighted material. We began by asking whether
respondents were familiar with subscription streaming sites like Netflix and
Spotify. We then asked those who were familiar a set of follow-up questions
that inquired whether or not the respondents would be more likely to access
a media title through such a service if they could not acquire a copy that could
be lent, resold, or used on their device of choice. We then asked a similar set
of questions about unauthorized downloading of works to those who reported
being familiar with BitTorrent or The Pirate Bay.
III. RESULTS
The MediaShop survey reveals a number of insights about how consumers
understand—or misunderstand—digital transactions. A surprisingly high
percentage of consumers believe that when they Buy Now, they acquire the
same sort of rights to use and transfer digital media goods that they acquire
when they purchase physical goods. The data also strongly suggest that these
rights matter to consumers. They are willing to pay more for those rights, and
they are more likely to acquire media through other means, both lawful and
unlawful, in the absence of those rights. Finally, our study suggests that a
77 Asking these follow-up questions for each behavior would have significantly increased the
time necessary to complete the survey, likely reducing both complete responses and the reliability
of those responses. See Andy Peytchev, Survey Breakoff, PUB. OPINION Q., Spring 2009, at 74, 85
fig.2 (noting the impact of survey length on participation and completion). The median time of
completion in the MediaShop survey was 607 seconds, that is, just over ten minutes.
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relatively simple and inexpensive intervention—adding a short notice to a
digital product page that outlines consumer rights in straightforward language—
is an effective means of significantly reducing consumer misperceptions.
A. How Consumers Understand Their Rights
Across the four notice conditions, we observed significant variations in
the frequency with which respondents believed that they had obtained rights
to engage in particular behaviors after completing a transaction. On the
whole, respondents who saw the Buy Now button for a physical good
understood their rights most accurately.78 Those who saw the same Buy Now
button on a digital good apparently carried over assumptions from physical
goods, and reported the least accurate beliefs about their rights. Our two
interventions for digital goods—the License Now button and the short
notice—both reduced mistaken beliefs among respondents, but the short
notice was considerably more effective.79
1. Buy Now for Digital Goods
Roughly one quarter of our respondents viewed a digital product page
that included the familiar Buy Now button. Their responses to a series of
questions about what rights, if any, they acquired after completing that
transaction are summarized in Figure 5 below.
78 Respondents’ perceptions of their rights varied between groups with certain demographic
and behavioral characteristics. Men were significantly more likely than women to believe that they
could resell, give away, leave in a will, and make copies of the good for others. In terms of age,
respondents between the ages of 25 and 34 were considerably more likely—and respondents over
the age of 65 considerably less likely—to believe they had the right to lend, resell, give away, or leave
a media good in their wills. We also asked respondents how frequently they acquired media online,
lend their physical media, and resell their physical media. The more frequently respondents engaged
in those behaviors, the more likely they were to answer “Yes” when asked about their rights.
79 These general conclusions are also supported by our open-ended questions. Respondents
who viewed the Buy Now button were far more likely than those who viewed either the short notice
or License Now conditions to express the view that they were purchasing a media good. In fact, 577
Buy Now respondents (n=662), split nearly equally between digital and analog shoppers, said that
Buy Now meant they were making a purchase. In comparison, only 87 License Now respondents
(n=310) expressed that belief. For the short notice, that number dropped to 29 (n=327). Conversely,
respondents were significantly less likely to express the view that Buy Now implied any limits on
their use and enjoyment of the media good. No analog shopper identified such limits, and only one
Buy Now digital shopper did. That number increased moderately, to 14, for those who saw the License
Now button. But 141 of those who viewed the short notice responded that it imposed some rule or
limitation on their use. 72 short notice users indicated specifically that they were not allowed to
share or sell the media. Likewise, the number of respondents who said a copyright license was being
proposed depended on which notice condition they saw. Again, no physical shoppers made that
claim, and one Buy Now digital shopper indicated the transaction gave the user a license. Not
surprisingly, that number shot up to 77 under the License Now condition. More interestingly, 32
respondents said the short notice communicated that a license was in the offering.

2017]

What We Buy When We Buy Now

337

Figure 5: Percentage of Respondents Who Believe “Buy Now”
Confers Rights in Digital Goods (n=333)

A sizable majority of respondents—just over 83%—believed that after
clicking the Buy Now button, they owned the digital good in question.
Ownership is both a complex legal conclusion and an intuitive claim about an
individual’s relationship to a product. It is also a concept the precise contours
of which are contested in the digital economy.80 In that sense, a claim about
ownership is not falsifiable; it is more like a gauge of a consumer’s overall
impression of a transaction.81 Nonetheless, the high affirmative response rate
to this question seems to belie the claims made by some rights holders and
retailers that consumers understand perfectly well that when they click Buy
Now they are simply acquiring a license.82
More than 86% of respondents who saw the Buy Now button believed that
they were entitled to keep their digital purchase for as long as they wanted.83 That
is typically the case with physical media. You can keep your hardcover books or
vinyl records forever, barring theft, fire, or some other disaster.

80 See generally AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP:
PERSONAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (2016) (discussing competing notions of
ownership in the context of the digital marketplace).
81 We were able to identify the substantive rights respondents most closely associated with
ownership. The right to keep the good forever was most predictive of a respondent’s claim of ownership,
followed closely by the rights to leave the good in one’s will, to give it away, and to resell it.
82 See supra note 26.
83 Honoré referred to this entitlement as both “the right of possession” and “the absence of
term.” Honoré, supra note 2, at 113-15, 121-23.
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For digital goods, the same is not true. Access to one’s media in the digital
world is more contingent, as digital-good sellers have the ability to affect
consumers after the initial transaction. Transactions for such digital goods are
continuous and subject to both business failures and petty meddling from
service providers. Contract law affords digital platforms protection against suit,
while the technological affordances of the platform shape users’ rights in
surprising, non-negotiable ways.84 For instance, digital retailers might go out
of business or decide to shut down their media servers.85 They might shift to a
subscription model, converting purchases to rentals.86 They might wipe clean
customer accounts or devices for violating their terms of service.87 They might
deny consumers access to purchases made in one country when they move to
another.88 They might remotely delete purchases, as Amazon and Apple have
done.89 Or they might decide, as Barnes and Noble recently did, to deny
customers access to their purchased ebooks when their credit cards expire.90

84 Cf. Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information
Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75, 81 (2015) (describing how technology allows companies to monitor
and enforce agreements in previously unknown ways).
85 See supra text accompanying note 10 (discussing the difficulty customers have accessing
digital purchases when companies file for bankruptcy or shut down).
86 See Nate Hoffelder, Scholastic to Close Storia eBookstore; Customers Could Lose Access to Their
eBook Purchases, DIGITAL READER (July 27, 2014), http://the-digital-reader.com/2014/07/27/scholasticclose-storia-ebookstore-customers-will-lose-access-ebook-purchases/#.U_fFdvSE-a5 [https://perma.cc
/7GLH-SDAR] (describing academic publisher Scholastic’s shutdown of its educational ebook store
in favor of a subscription service and its message to consumers that “[t]he switch to streaming means
that eBooks you’ve previously purchased may soon no longer be accessible”).
87 Linn Nygaard, a Norwegian Kindle customer, lost dozens of ebooks she bought from
Amazon. They vanished without notice when Amazon erased her Kindle, citing unspecified “abuse
of [its] policies.” Mark King, Amazon Wipes Customer’s Kindle and Deletes Account with No Explanation,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2012, 10:25 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/money/2012/oct/22/amazon-wipes
-customers-kindle-deletes-account [https://perma.cc/3JGA-5LJK]. Nygaard’s account, which was later
reinstated, likely violated Amazon’s terms because the Kindle Store had not yet launched in Norway.
See Michelle Jaworski, Amazon Restores Kindle User’s Mysteriously-Deleted Account, Still No Explanation,
DAILY DOT (Oct. 23, 2012, 5:54 PM), http://www.dailydot.com/news/amazon-linn-nygaard-deleted-account
-restored/ [https://perma.cc/UXA5-ASU4] (noting that Nygaard’s problems seemed to stem from the
fact that “because she lived in Norway, where Amazon has no offices, she [was told that she] would
have to provide a U.K. address to get the replacement” when her Kindle broke while she was traveling).
88 Purchases from the Apple iTunes store are linked to the user’s home country address, and
Apple warns users that if they switch countries in their iTunes account, “You won’t see the items
that you purchased from the previous country’s store in your Purchased section.” Change Your iTunes
Store Country or Region, APPLE, https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201389?cid=tw_sr [https://perma.
cc/FQ8F-KHNM] (last updated Sept. 22, 2016).
89 See supra text accompanying notes 5 and 39.
90 See Tim Cushing, Barnes & Noble Decides that Purchased Ebooks Are Only Yours Until Your
Credit Card Expires, TECHDIRT (Nov. 27, 2012, 11:42 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20121126
/18084721154/barnes-noble-decides-that-purchased-ebooks-are-only-yours-until-your-credit-card-expires.
shtml [https://perma.cc/AD6V-TK6W] (describing how customers could no longer access purchases
when their credit cards expired).
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Moreover, risk-of-loss and termination provisions that are common in license
agreements insulate retailers from any legal liability for these behaviors.91
An almost equally large majority of respondents believed that when they
clicked Buy Now, they could use the digital media on the device of their choice.
For consumers with various makes and models of laptops, smartphones, tablets,
ereaders and media players, the appeal of that freedom is easy to understand.
In some cases, consumers are correct in their belief. But in others, they are
mistaken. Unfortunately, the factors that determine whether consumers are
right or wrong are not easy to assess. Some retailers have embraced the diversity
of the digital ecosystem. Amazon, for example, supports a wide range of devices
for digital media, from its own Kindle line to Apple iOS and Android devices,
including even the latest NOOK ereader from its competitor Barnes and Noble.
Amazon sees the ability to read ebooks on a buyer’s device of choice as a selling
point. Its choice to sell music in the standard MP3 format paints a similar picture.
But other retailers have taken a more closed approach to device
compatibility. Apple’s iBooks can only be read on Apple devices. The same is
true for iTunes music and movies. Through a combination of license terms,
proprietary file formats, and DRM, Apple has tethered the media it sells to
its own hardware. That choice reveals the differing business philosophies of
Apple and Amazon. Amazon works hard to keep prices low to attract an everlarger customer base.92 It sells Kindle ereaders and tablets at break-even
prices and may actually lose money on each sale,93 but it hopes to profit in
the long run by increasing sales of its content.94 Apple—despite selling
billions of dollars’ worth of apps, movies, and music—is in the hardware
business. And its profit margin on devices like the iPhone 6 has been
estimated to be as high as sixty-nine percent, leading to quarterly profits of
91

Consider the following language:
Risk of Loss. Risk of loss for Kindle Content transfers when you download or access
the Kindle Content . . . .
Termination. Your rights under this Agreement will automatically terminate if you
fail to comply with any term of this Agreement. In case of such termination, you must
cease all use of the Service, and Amazon may immediately revoke your access to the
Service without refund of any fees. Amazon’s failure to insist upon or enforce your
strict compliance with this Agreement will not constitute a waiver of any of its rights.

Kindle Store Terms of Use, supra note 14.
92 See Kelly Clay, Amazon Confirms It Makes No Profit on Kindles, FORBES (Oct. 12, 2012, 1:10
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyclay/2012/10/12/amazon-confirms-it-makes-no-profit-on-kindles/
[https://perma.cc/AY58-4A87] (reporting that Amazon derives its profits from sales of content, not
Kindles); Steve Kovach, Amazon Will Lose Millions Selling the Kindle Fire, But That’s the Point, BUS.
INSIDER (Sept. 30, 2011, 2:32 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/kindle-fire-profit-margins-2011-9 [https:
//perma.cc/AT98-AQAF] (noting that Amazon was selling Kindle Fire at a loss to “gain rapid adoption”).
93 Id.
94 Id.
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over ten billion dollars.95 Apple has every incentive to keep its customers, and
their media purchases, within its ecosystem.
Ultimately, whether buyers are correct in their belief about device
compatibility depends on choices made by retailers, rather than their own legal
rights. In the MediaShop study, for example, the license limited respondents
to the use of “Supported Devices.” Of course, only a handful knew that, since
the vast majority did not read the license terms.
Lending is a widely recognized right of property owners.96 Book lending
is a centuries-old American cultural practice,97 and people have been lending
music and movies for as long as they have been available for sale. The same
is true for gift-giving. More than 40% of survey respondents believed that
lending and gift-giving rights persist when they “Buy Now” in the digital
marketplace.98 However, nearly every license for digital goods forbids lending
and gifts. The Amazon Instant Video and MP3 stores, Apple iTunes, Google
Play, Sony Playstation Network, Microsoft Xbox Live, and countless smaller
digital retailers explicitly bar consumers from lending, renting, giving away,
or otherwise transferring their purchases.99
95 See Oscar Williams-Grut, Apple’s iPhone: The Most Profitable Product in History, INDEPENDENT
(Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/apples-iphone-themost-profitable-product-in-history-10009741.html [https://perma.cc/3ZTU-KYW8] (reporting Apple’s
quarterly profits and industry estimates that the profit margin on the iPhone 6 could reach sixtynine percent); see also Daisuke Wakabayashi, Apple’s Market Cap Loses $60 Billion After iPhone Sales
Disappoint, WALL ST. J. (July 22, 2015, 10:02 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-earnings-boostedby-iphone-sales-1437510647 [https://perma.cc/W6L7-PP2F] (noting that “[t]he iPhone now overshadows
the rest of Apple’s businesses”).
96 See Honoré, supra note 2, at 118 (noting that “the right to the capital” includes “the power to
alienate the thing”); O’Reilly, supra note 1.
97 Benjamin Franklin, for example, founded the Library Company of Philadelphia in 1731. See
LIBRARY CO. OF PHILA., “AT THE INSTANCE OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN”: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
LIBRARY COMPANY OF PHILADELPHIA 5 (2015), http://www.librarycompany.org/about/Instance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FK67-XW2B] (describing how Benjamin Franklin and his friends pooled their
money so they could afford to import books).
98 In theory, respondents could have misunderstood this question as one asking whether they
could lend their physical device—a Kindle or an iPad—containing a digital media title rather than
asking, as we intended, whether they could lend that particular digital media purchase. We carefully
designed the wording of our questions to avoid this possibility by asking whether respondents could
lend the particular “ebook,” “MP3 album,” or “movie” for which they paid.
Since the questions were phrased identically, the responses we received to questions concerning
gifts and resale also bolster our confidence that respondents did not misinterpret our questions.
Although a substantial number of respondents reported believing that they could engage in these
activities, we would have expected those numbers to be considerably higher if they read the questions
to be inquiring into their ability to resell, give away, or lend their Kindle or iPad. See infra subsection
III.A.4 (discussing participants’ responses to questions addressing the Buy Now button for physical
goods). In analyzing our open-ended questions, only five of the 333 consumers presented with the
Buy Now button signaled that it could mean an ability to lend the device to others.
99 See Amazon Music Terms of Use, supra note 14 (“[Y]ou may not . . . assign, . . . rent, share,
lend, . . . license or otherwise transfer or use Purchased Music . . . .”); Amazon Video Terms of Use,
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In response to consumer demand, some retailers have introduced programs
that mimic certain aspects of traditional lending. The Kindle and NOOK stores
both offer restricted lending for some books.100 If publishers opt in, consumers
can lend an ebook—one time only—for fourteen days. Apple’s Family Sharing
program allows digital media purchases to be shared with up to six accounts,
provided the accounts all share the same credit card information.101 But these
programs do not include all works, and they are limited in fundamental respects
that render them poor substitutes for a true right to alienate.
Consumers are accustomed to inheriting physical media. In our study,
nearly thirty percent of respondents believed they could bequest their ebooks,
MP3s, and digital movies in their wills.102 Thus, it appears that for many, the
expectations established in the tangible era have survived the shift to digital
copies. Although the owner of a computer or hard drive could leave that
tangible object in her will, that is at best an incomplete solution for transferring
ownership of digital content. To start, many media libraries are stored on the
cloud rather than a local device. And when a media library is stored locally, it
is likely intermingled with other files. A hard drive or laptop might include
digital music, movies, and books, not to mention emails, financial records,
and personal photos. If those files cannot be copied to other storage media,
efforts to effectuate wills could be frustrated. Both public and private efforts

AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201422760 [https://perma.
cc/M4C6-CR66] (last updated Jan. 25, 2016) (“[Y]ou may not . . . rent, lease, [or] distribute . . . any
right to the Digital Content to any third party . . . .”); Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions,
supra note 14 (“You agree not to modify, rent, loan, sell, or distribute the Services or Content in any
manner, and you shall not exploit the Services in any manner not expressly authorized.”); Google Play
Terms of Service, GOOGLE, https://play.google.com/about/play-terms.html [https://perma.cc/MX4HT5G4] (last updated July 27, 2016) (“You may not . . . rent, lease, redistribute . . . or transfer or assign
any Content or your rights to Content to any third party without authorization, including with
regard to any downloads of Content that you may obtain through Google Play.”); Microsoft Services
Agreement, MICROSOFT: XBOX (Aug. 2015), http://www.xbox.com/en-US/Legal/LiveTOU [https://
perma.cc/4QCJ-LMYK] (“You may not . . . rent, lease or lend the application; or transfer the
application or this agreement to any third party.”); Terms of Service and User Agreement, supra note 17
(“You may not . . . rent, lease, [or] loan . . . any portion of the Property.”).
100 See Jeff Bercovici, A Pretty Good Solution to The Problem of E-Book Lending (Or At Least I Think
So), FORBES (Aug. 22, 2012, 12:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2012/08/22/a-prettygood-solution-to-the-e-book-lending-wars-or-at-least-i-think-so [https://perma.cc/QW8W-4AEJ] (describing
how lending is currently restricted to “short-term, one-time loans of some but not all titles”).
101 See Family Sharing, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/icloud/family-sharing/ [https://perma.
cc/E7V5-GQME] (“To get started, one adult in your household — the organizer — invites up to
five additional family members and agrees to pay for any iTunes, iBooks, and App Store purchases
they initiate while part of the family group.”).
102 A full 50% of respondents who saw the Buy Now button for digital goods chose “I don’t
know” when asked this question.
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to address these sorts of concerns are underway, but they have yet to directly
confront license restrictions applied to digital media.103
Likewise, 16% of respondents believed that clicking the Buy Now button
gives them the right to resell their digital goods. Used booksellers have
operated in the United States for centuries. Benjamin Franklin and Thomas
Jefferson built their personal libraries in part by buying used books.104 Used
record stores have been around for decades, and online resale markets like eBay
enable the sale of all manner of used media goods. But like lending and giftgiving, resale is uniformly barred by license terms applied to digital goods.105
Finally, 14% of respondents believed that they were entitled to make
copies of the digital good for other people. Although some exceptions apply,
copyright law generally prohibits this behavior.106 Tellingly, fewer
respondents answered yes to this question than any other. Nonetheless, a
considerable percentage of respondents—and particularly those shopping for
digital music—believed clicking Buy Now gave them this right. This result
suggests that there is a subset of consumers who tend to overestimate their
rights. It is also indicative of a potential mismatch between the expectations
of consumers and the dictates of copyright law.
103 Delaware became the first state to enact the Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act, a model
law developed by the Uniform Law Commission. That law gives heirs and other beneficiaries of an
estate the power to control digital accounts and assets—including text, audio, video, and software—
and to request transfers or copies of those assets. But the Act contains a crucial limitation: control
over digital assets is limited “to the extent permitted under . . . any end user license agreement.”
Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets and Digital Accounts Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 5004 (2015);
see generally UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIG. ASSETS ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS
ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2014), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%
20Digital%20Assets/2014_UFADAA_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3V7U-R2AL] (“The purpose of this
act is to vest fiduciaries with the authority to access, control, or copy digital assets and accounts.”).
California enacted a fiduciary access to digital assets law in September 2016. Revised Uniform
Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act, CAL. PROB. CODE § 820 (2016). In terms of private action,
Google’s Inactive Account Manager and Facebook’s Legacy Contact are tools to facilitate account
transfer after the death of a user. See Geoffrey A. Fowler, Facebook Heir? Time to Choose Who Manages
Your Account When You Die, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 12, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/facebookheir-time-to-choose-who-manages-your-account-when-you-die-1423738802 [https://perma.cc/5NH6SMFB] (noting that Facebook allows users to designate an individual to manage parts of their
accounts posthumously).
104 See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1364-65 (2013) (“Used-book dealers tell
us that, from the time when Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson built commercial and personal
libraries of foreign books, American readers have bought used books published and printed abroad.”).
105 See, e.g., Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions, supra note 14 (“You agree not to . . . sell
. . . the Services or Content in any manner . . . .”); Kindle Store Terms of Use, supra note 14 (“Unless
specifically indicated otherwise, you may not sell . . . any rights to the Kindle Content . . . .”).
106 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (providing that “the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights . . . to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords” (emphasis
added)). This right is not absolute. See id. §§ 107–08 (carving out exceptions to copyright owner’s
exclusive right to reproduction for libraries and archives, among others). But as a general rule,
unauthorized reproduction is prohibited.
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When consumers are presented with digital media goods and the Buy Now
button, we observe considerable misunderstanding about the rights they
obtain through those transactions. If the Buy Now button sends a false signal
to consumers, perhaps another button that better describes the nature of these
digital transactions would communicate a more accurate set of expectations.
2. License Now for Digital Goods
Since the overwhelming majority of retailers and rights holders
characterize these deals as licenses, we replaced Buy Now with License Now on
the MediaShop products pages to see what impact, if any, it would have on
consumers’ perceptions of their rights. The results of this intervention are
represented for each media type in Figures 6–8.
The most apparent shift was a reduction in the number of respondents
who believed they “owned” the digital goods under the License Now scenario.
For both ebooks and MP3s, we observed a statistically significant decrease—
from 86% to 50%, and from 83% to 62%, respectively.107 The decline for digital
movies was notable—78% to 69%—but not statistically significant.
We also saw significant shifts in respondents’ beliefs regarding other
rights. While the number of respondents who believed they were entitled to
lend their digital movies actually increased slightly, the number of respondents
who selected “I don’t know” increased markedly, from 23% under the Buy Now
condition to 35% for License Now. This suggests respondents were less certain
about their rights when presented with the option to License Now.
A similar effect was visible when it came to the question of whether
respondents believed they were entitled to keep their digital purchases. For
ebooks, “I don’t know” responses increased from 7% to 19%, while “No”
responses decreased from 6% to 0%. For digital movies, the number of
respondents who believed they were entitled to keep the movie indefinitely
decreased by 9%, while “I don’t know” responses increased by 13%.
Finally, for digital movies we saw an increase in the percentage of
consumers who believed they were entitled to resell their digital goods.
Although this increase—from 17% to 23%—fell just short of significance, it
was accompanied by a 15% drop in “No” responses and a 10% increase in “I
don’t know” responses.

107

We define statistical significance as p <0.05 using Pearson’s chi-squared test.
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Figures 6: Percentage of Respondents Who Believe “Buy Now” and
“License Now” Confer Rights for ebooks

The License Now button reduced the number of affirmative responses to the ownership question
but had little other effect.

Figure 7: Percentage of Respondents Who Believe “Buy Now” and
“License Now” Confer Rights for MP3s

The License Now button reduced the number of affirmative responses to the ownership question
but had little other effect.
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Figure 8: Percentage of Respondents Who Believe “Buy Now” and
“License Now” Confer Rights for Digital Movies

For digital movies, exposure to the License Now button had a mixed effect on respondents.

Overall, the License Now intervention suggests that the language used to
characterize a transaction does have an impact on what rights consumers
believe they acquire. But the term “license” conveys an unclear message to
online shoppers. Given the range of terms a license may contain and the fact
that most consumers have never read those terms, we are not surprised to
find that the License Now button conveys inconsistent messages to consumers.
3. Short Notice of Rights for Digital Goods
In addition to the License Now button, we tested a second intervention
that informed consumers about the specific rights they obtained in their
digital goods. This intervention operated from the premise that a single word
like “buy” or “license” is unlikely to capture the complex and perhaps
counterintuitive set of rights that retailers and rights holders envision in the
digital marketplace. Instead, we supplemented the existing license terms with
a short, prominent, easily readable, bullet-point list of the behaviors consumers
could engage in and those that they could not. This approach builds on prior
experience with layered notice schemes that employ a simple, short notice to
alert individuals of the most salient terms contained in a longer, less-accessible
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document.108 From online privacy policies,109 HIPAA disclosures,110 and credit
solicitations,111 layered notices have been encouraged or required as a way to
increase consumer comprehension of complex agreements or legal regimes.
Yet notice remains a controversial approach in consumer protection. In
their 2013 book, Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider summarized a wealth
of research on disclosure rules and argued that mandated disclosure simply does
not work.112 The notice model, they argued, makes assumptions about human
behavior and thinking that simply are not true in practice.113 The duo also
argued that notice leads to lazy policymaking that avoids tough questions by
simply putting more and more notices before consumers that go unread.114
Further research has explored how consumers respond to notice in the
privacy context. In one study, Ben-Shahar and Adam Chilton illustrated how
different privacy notices of varying quality fail to change consumer behavior or
their knowledge of privacy practices.115 In addition, Aleecia M. McDonald et al.
tested several alternatives of privacy policies, but found that layered notices,
standard policies, and a process that presented practices as bullet points all

108 See Nathaniel Good, Jens Grossklags, David Thaw, Aaron Perzanowski, Deirdre Mulligan,
& Joseph Konstan, User Choices and Regret: Understanding Users’ Decision Process About Consensually
Acquired Spyware, 2 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 283, 294 (2006) (describing multi-layered
notices, which include a short, condensed notice “layered” on top of the complete, detailed notice in
order to improve consumer notification efficiency while still complying with legal notice requirements).
109 See Lorrie Faith Cranor, Necessary but Not Sufficient: Standardized Mechanisms for Privacy
Notice and Choice, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 273, 293 (2012) (describing the use of privacy
icons as a means of short-form notice for privacy policies); Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable
Privacy Policies: Mismatches Between Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 39,
48 (2015) (describing how layered notices are used to “present a website’s privacy policy”).
110 See Marie C. Pollio, The Inadequacy of HIPAA’s Privacy Rule: The Plain Language Notice of
Privacy Practices and Patient Understanding, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 579, 615 (2004) (describing
how the United Stated Department of Health and Human Services “permits the notice [to patients]
to be provided in ‘layered’ format”).
111 See Prescreen Opt-Out Notice, 16 C.F.R. § 642.3 (2015) (requiring that consumers be
provided with both “short” and “long” notices); see also Katy K. Liu, Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act Regulations: Disclosure, Opt-Out Rights, Medical Information Usage, and Consumer
Information Disposal, 2 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 715, 720 (2006) (explaining that the
Federal Trade Commission “requires a ‘layered notice’ because the FTC believes that [the notice]
effectively carries out the requirements of the” Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003).
112 See generally OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED
TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014); see also MARGARET JANE RADIN,
BOILERPLATE 218-21 (2013) (examining the U.S.’s preference for requiring more disclosure as a means
to protect consumers).
113 See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 112, at 47 (“[M]any disclosures fail because
disclosees lack the literacy, intelligence, and sophistication to understand them.”).
114 See id. at 139 (“Legislatures pass disclosure laws overwhelmingly, partly because they please
the whole political spectrum.”).
115 See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Adam S. Chilton, Simplification of Privacy Disclosures: An
Experimental Test (Univ. Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 737, 2016), http:
//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2711474 [https://perma.cc/D82Y-F5D4].
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performed similarly.116 In the privacy context, there is good reason to believe
that clearer notices do not improve consumer comprehension of practices. This
is because consumers see the term “privacy policy” as a seal and assume that its
presence is a guarantee of protection.117 Yet some researchers have been
optimistic that notices based on nutrition labels—standardized, prominent, and
clearly written—could inform consumers of company practice.118 Others have
called for a “warning label” approach.119 Such an approach was tested by BenShahar and Chilton, and it resulted in an improvement in consumer
comprehension of privacy practices.120 As Richard Craswell has observed, BenShahar’s argument overstates the case against consumer notice and is not in
conversation with the well-developed literature that recognizes the varied
purposes and applications of notice regimes.121 Ben-Shahar and Schneider’s
critique is universalist in approach, yet notices in different contexts do serve a
useful purpose—consider, for example, the important policy and practice
contributions that have flowed from security breach notification.122
To test notice as an approach to digital rights understanding, we designed
short notices for each of our three media types. As Figure 9 illustrates, the
chief substantive difference between them is that ebooks and digital movies
116 See Aleecia M. McDonald et al., A Comparative Study of Online Privacy Policies and Formats,
PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHS. 37, 49-50 (2009) (reporting that all of the tested formats “were
unsatisfactory”).
117 See Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jennifer M. Urban, Alan Westin’s Privacy Homo Economicus, 49
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261, 282 (2014) (“[I]nternet users falsely believe that privacy policies convey
specific, legally enforceable rights to users.”). The FTC spent years studying how banks could best
disclose information-sharing. One of the agency’s conclusions was that such disclosures should not
be labeled “privacy policies” because consumers interpreted this statement more expansively than
what legal protections actually provide for financial data. See Symposium Conference on Behavioral
Economics and Consumer Policy (2007) (statement of Joel Winston, Associate Director, Div. of
Identify Prot., Bureau of Consumer Prot., Fed. Trade Comm’n) (explaining that consumers
specifically believed privacy policies meant the institution never shared the consumers’ information,
which was usually not the case in practice).
118 See Patrick Gage Kelley et al., Standardizing Privacy Notices: An Online Study of the Nutrition
Label Approach, ACM-CHI (2010) (evaluating users’ understanding of privacy policies by “[c]ompar[ing]
two varients of [the ‘nutrition label’] approach with a standardized-text format [and] two formats
currently in use”).
119 See generally Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 24, at 553 (outlining how the authors’ proposed
“warning box” would function).
120 See Ben-Shahar & Chilton, supra note 115, at 25 (finding “a highly statistically significant”
increase in respondent comprehension after viewing a short warning label of surprising terms).
Puzzlingly, Ben-Shahar and Chilton concluded that their results suggest “that the simplification of
disclosures did not change people’s understanding of them.” Id. at 28.
121 See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, and How Not to Judge Their
Success or Failure, 88 WASH. L. REV. 333, 337-40 (2013) (discussing the broad range of purposes and
goals that disclosures attempt to serve).
122 See CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 227
(2016) (“[S]ecurity breach notification laws create strong incentives to collect less trigger information, to
encrypt it, or to segment it technologically so that name was separate from other trigger information.”).

348

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 165: 315

could be used on “approved devices,” while that limitation was omitted from
the short notice for MP3 albums. We are not trained designers and do not
hold this particular notice out as the perfect design solution. We are confident
that experts, given time and resources, could improve on our efforts.123
Nonetheless, even this proof-of-concept design was effective at improving
consumers’ understanding of their digital rights.124

Figure 9: The MediaShop Short Notices

Figures 10–12 compare the affirmative answers to questions about consumer
rights under the Buy Now and short notice conditions. Overall, the short notice
was considerably more effective in reducing consumer misperceptions of their
rights than the License Now condition. It is worth noting, however, that in both
instances respondents encountered the License Now button and the short
notice provision for the first time during the MediaShop survey. Additionally,
each respondent viewed those notices only once, likely for no more than
several seconds. The Buy Now button, in contrast, is a staple of online shopping.
With repeated consumer interaction with these new notice provisions, we
expect the effects described below to be even more pronounced.125

For example, some respondents complained that the text was too small to be easily read.
One might object that design elements of short notices, and, in particular, the thumbs-up and
thumbs-down icons, express a normative viewpoint about various rights and restrictions. We do not
dispute that there is a normative component to our notice design, but we believe it is one that reflects
the pre-existing preferences of consumers as described in more detail below. See infra Section III.B.
125 There is some chance that respondents paid greater attention to the short notice because it
departed from their expectations. One might worry that, over time, it would become less effective
rather than more. If, in fact, novelty increases consumer attention and decreases deception, that fact
should inform retailers’ obligations in the design of their advertising.
123
124

2017]

What We Buy When We Buy Now

349

Under the short notice condition, affirmative responses to the ownership
question dropped significantly for each of the three media types—23% for
ebooks, 20% for MP3s, and 13% for movies. For lending, we observed significant
decreases for ebooks and MP3s—13% and 12%, respectively. For digital movies,
there was no statistically significant change. Likewise, respondents who saw the
short notice were less likely to believe they were entitled to resell digital
goods; affirmative responses to that question were cut in half from 12% to 6%
for ebooks. The results for MP3s were even more dramatic; they dropped
from 17% to 6%. But again, the results were unchanged for digital movies.126
When asked if they could leave their digital goods in their wills, ebook
shoppers who saw the short notice were half as likely as their Buy Now
counterparts to answer “Yes,” a drop from 26% to 13%. Although they fell
outside our standard for significance, the results for MP3s and digital movies
are worth noting. Affirmative responses for MP3s dropped by 11%. For digital
movies, affirmative responses held steady, but we observed a 14% shift from
“I don’t know” to “No” when compared to the Buy Now responses, suggesting
an increase in respondent certainty about their rights.
Respondents acted similarly when asked about the right to give digital
media away as a gift. We saw a 10% drop in affirmative responses for ebooks
and a 14% decrease for MP3s, although neither result was statistically
significant. And for digital movies, the affirmative response rate was essentially
unchanged, but we observed a significant increase in “No” responses, up 12%,
and a corresponding decrease in “I don’t know” responses of 15%.127
Although our short notice could undoubtedly be improved through testing
alternative designs, placements, and interactions, it is nonetheless a remarkably
low-cost intervention. And where false consumer perceptions can be avoided at
little cost, we might be especially inclined to impose a legal obligation to do so.128

126 Respondents who indicated an interest in movies were less likely to be over the age of 65 and less
likely to be female. Both of those demographics tended to answer “Yes” to these questions less frequently.
This self-selection bias may be a cause of the misalignment in our results. Cf. infra subsection III.B.1.
127 Comparing the Buy Now and short notice conditions, respondents were just as likely to answer
“Yes” when asked about their rights to keep their digital media and use them on their device of choice.
128 See generally Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657 (1985)
(arguing in favor of a cost–benefit approach to false advertising claims).
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Figure 10: Percentage of Respondents Who Believe “Buy Now” and
Short Notice Confer Rights for ebooks

Ebook buyers who see the short notice have a more accurate view of their rights.

Figure 11: Percentage of Respondents Who Believe “Buy Now” and
Short Notice Confer Rights for MP3s

MP3 buyers who see the short notice have a more accurate view of their rights.
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Figure 12: Percentage of Respondents Who Believe “Buy Now” and
Short Notice Confer Rights for Digital Movies

The short notice intervention was less successful at informing digital movie buyers of their rights.

4. Buy Now for Tangible Goods
Respondents who saw the Buy Now button for tangible goods—paperback
books, CDs, and Blu-ray discs—demonstrated a considerably more accurate
understanding of their rights than those who saw the button for digital goods.
Nonetheless, a surprising number underestimated their ability to transfer the
products they buy.
Figure 13 illustrates the responses for those who viewed tangible copy
product pages with the standard Buy Now button. In contrast to digital media,
the correct answer to most of these questions was “Yes”—the key exception
being the right to make copies for others. When it came to ownership, retaining
possession, using the device of the consumer’s choice, and giving away the copy,
the results are unsurprising; respondents understood their rights, and very
few chose “No.” But for three rights—lending, bequeathing, and reselling—
we observed a higher degree of misperception. For lending, 23% and 15% of
respondents expressed the belief that they could not lend their CDs and Bluray discs, respectively. And across all three media types, 19% of respondents
believed they could not bequest their tangible media in their wills, and a
remarkable 36% believed that they could not resell their physical purchases.
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Figure 13: Percentage Who Believe “Buy Now” Confers Rights for Hard Copies

The overwhelming majority of respondents had an accurate view of their rights in
physical media. However, some believed that they did not have the right to lend, gift,
will, or resell these materials.

How might we explain these misperceptions? And what, if anything, do
they tell us about deception in the market for digital goods? Given the low
incidence of “No” responses for several rights, consumers do not appear
generally confused about their rights in tangible media. So perhaps there is
something about reselling, bequeathing, and lending that explains these
misperceptions. Consumers may assume, for example, that because resale
involves the exchange of money, it crosses some line separating lawful and
unlawful behavior. Perhaps they are generally unfamiliar with the law of wills.
And in an era of easy reproduction, they may be less accustomed to the simple
act of sharing a physical copy. There is no shortage of plausible explanations,
but on the basis of our data, we cannot endorse any in particular.
In terms of their implications, these misperceptions about rights in
tangible media do not detract from our findings for digital goods. A skeptic
may counter that since consumers are confused about lending and resale when
it comes to tangible copies, their confusion in the digital space is not cause for
alarm. But that argument overlooks two key points. First, an ebook and a
paperback are different products with different attributes. It is no defense to a
deceptive advertising claim to point out that consumers are also misled about

2017]

353

What We Buy When We Buy Now

other distinct, but related, products. Second, when it comes to tangible goods,
consumers underestimate their rights. That is, they think they have fewer rights
than they acquire in fact. Since consumers buy the product despite their
misperceptions, that may mean either that those rights are not material or that
there has been no injury. For digital goods, our data establish just the opposite.
Consumers overestimate their rights and incorrectly think they are entitled to
lend, resell, and otherwise transfer their goods when licenses insist they cannot.
To the extent consumers rely on their experience with tangible media as
a template for understanding their digital media rights, the misperceptions
of tangible media respondents may actually reinforce our findings. One way
to interpret the notable level of confusion among tangible goods consumers
is that some subset of those consumers is pessimistic about certain rights,
specifically, lending, reselling, and bequeathing. That subset tends to assume
the absence of those rights, despite the fact that they have long been clearly
established by the law. If so, that general pessimism might account for some
of the respondents who answered “No” to those questions when they
encountered digital goods. In other words, the confusion we observed for
tangible goods may be the result of a general pessimism about those rights
which—if shared by digital media consumers—tamp down the degree of
misperception we reported for digital goods.
5. The Rights Score Metric
In addition to measuring respondents’ beliefs about individual rights, we also
assessed the accuracy of those beliefs in the aggregate. We scored each
respondent’s answers according to the criteria in Figure 14. Each correct response
was worth one point, and each respondent received a score on a scale from 0 to 7.
Figure 14: Rights Scores Correct Responses

Digital Books
and Movies
Digital Music
Physical Media

Keep

Device

Lend

Gift

Will

Resell

Copy

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No
Yes

Yes
Yes

No
Yes

No
Yes

No
Yes

No
Yes

No
No

The table shows the legally correct answers to the rights-based questions used to calculate
the Rights Score.
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We categorized “Rights Scores” into three groups: Low (0-2 points,
representing the 25th percentile of respondents), Medium (3-4 points; the
median score was 3, and the mean was 3.1), and High (5-7 points, representing
the 75th percentile of respondents). As Figure 15 depicts, nearly 60% of
respondents who viewed the Buy Now button for tangible copies received High
scores, and just 13% received Low scores. Compared to the tangible goods
Rights Scores, the performance of respondents who viewed the Buy Now and
License Now buttons for digital goods was practically a mirror image. The
majority received Low scores: 51% for Buy Now and 58% for License Now. Only
11% of Buy Now and 12% of License Now respondents got High scores. But the
short notice condition yielded considerable improvement for digital goods
Rights Scores: Low scores dropped to 40%, and High scores doubled to 23%.
Figure 15: Percentage Distribution of Rights Scores by Notice Condition

Respondents who purchased physical media had a high level of knowledge of rights, but
digital media shoppers had a poorer understanding.

As Figure 16 illustrates, respondents who viewed physical media scored
highest on average. Their mean score was 4.7 with a median of 5. Among
respondents who shopped for digital goods, those who viewed the short notice
performed the best, with a mean of 3 and a median of 3. Those who viewed the
Buy Now and License Now buttons scored considerably lower. The mean for Buy
Now respondents was 2.45 with a median of 2. For License Now respondents,
the mean was 2.27 with a median of 2. With the exception of the insignificant
difference between Buy Now and License Now for digital goods, changes in
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notice condition were highly significant with respect to Rights Scores. Our
short notice was responsible for a significant improvement in respondents’
understanding of their rights after a single exposure.
Figure 16: Mean Rights Score by Notice Condition

On average, physical media shoppers scored highest, followed by digital media shoppers
who viewed the short notice, Buy Now, and License Now conditions.

Ayres and Schwartz have proposed a warning box that “transparently and
succinctly alert[s] the reader to the unexpected” contract terms as a means of
improving consumer knowledge and combatting optimism bias in the context of
online agreements.129 Although our short notice implementation differs in some
important respects from the government warning box they suggest, the
significant increase in Rights Scores that we observed for respondents who viewed
the short notice offers some confirmation of Ayres and Schwartz’s prediction.130
We observed a significant relationship between Rights Scores and offline
behavior with respect to physical media. Respondents who reported lending

Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 24, at 580, 584.
For example, the notice Ayres and Schwartz propose would feature a “governmentprovided, standardized” design, would only include terms that were “less favorable than consumers
expect,” which “must be placed in order of decreasing likelihood that optimistic [consumer] mistakes
. . . might influence purchase behavior” and would require separate assent to this notice. Id. at 583-84.
129
130
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and reselling physical media infrequently or not at all were significantly less
likely to receive Low Rights Scores. This was particularly true for
respondents who viewed digital books and movies during the MediaShop
study. It would seem that frequent lending and reselling of physical media
creates an expectation that those rights extend to digital goods as well.
We should not expect the market to engage in some sort of spontaneous
self-correction. Despite a decade of digital media transactions, these
misperceptions remain widespread. Moreover, there is good reason to doubt
that a subset of informed consumers can effectively discipline the market in
a way that protects the interests of misled consumers.131
Although some degree of misperception is likely unavoidable, the language
used to market goods has a demonstrable impact. Buy Now communicated a set
of rights to most consumers. If those rights are not part of the bargained-for
transaction, retailers can minimize consumer misperceptions through prominent
use of language that clearly communicates the terms of the deal. But even if
consumers are mistaken about the bundle of rights that they are getting for
their money, that fact does not establish that their misperceptions are material
to their purchasing decisions.
B. Materiality
A claim is material to consumers if it influences their decisions in the
marketplace.132 We measured materiality in three ways. First, we asked
respondents to state their preferences with respect to three of the rights
surveyed above: the rights to lend, to resell, and to use media on their device
of choice. Second, we asked how much more, if anything, respondents would
be willing to pay for media goods that conferred those rights. Finally, we asked
whether the absence of those rights would make respondents more likely to
acquire digital media through other avenues. In order to ensure that respondents
were engaged and that we were closely replicating a real-world shopping
experience, we first gave them a choice between several popular media titles.

131 See R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother’s Keeper: The Inability of an Informed
Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 664 (1996) (explaining that
informed minorities are rare and that, where they do exist, they fail to solve imperfect information
problems in the market).
132 Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to John D. Dingell,
Chairman, Comm. on Energy & Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 14, 1983)
[hereinafter FTC Policy Statement on Deception] (“A ‘material’ misrepresentation or practice is
one which is likely to affect a consumer’s choice of or conduct regarding a product.”), reprinted in In
re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 app. at 182 (1984).
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1. Consumer Preferences for Rights
On the whole, respondents expressed a preference for lending, reselling,
and using media on their device of choice. Across media types and notice
conditions, 55% reported a moderate or strong preference for media they can
lend, 39% preferred media they can resell, and 85% preferred media compatible
with their device of choice. A number of respondents used the open-ended
questions to express these preferences without being prompted. When asked
what the short notice meant to them, they offered comments like the following:
“It means I need to leave this site and go somewhere else that doesn’t try to
restrict me from doing what I want with something I pay for.” “It means that I
can read the book but I cannot resell or lend it. This is information I like to
have, and I was glad to see it so prominently displayed.” “I probably won’t buy.
If I don’t own it when I buy it, I may as well buy the CD.”
We measured each respondent’s overall preference by combining these
three questions into a single variable, the Preference Thermometer. We
calculated that variable by assigning a value of +2 for each strong preference,
+1 for each moderate preference, 0 for no preference, -1 for each moderate
dispreference, and -2 for each strong dispreference. Respondents who strongly
preferred media goods they could not lend, resell, or use on their device of
choice scored -6; ones who strongly preferred each of those rights scored 6.
The distribution of the Preference Thermometer is represented below in
Figure 17. The median score was 3, and the mean was 2.8.
Figure 17: Percentage Distribution of Preference Thermometer

The overwhelming majority of respondents expressed some preference for the rights to lend,
resell, or use on their device of choice. Nearly 40% expressed a strong preference.
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When we compared respondents who viewed digital and tangible goods,
we observed a remarkable consistency in their preferences. As Figure 18
illustrates, the rate at which respondents preferred lending, reselling, and
using their device of choice was stable across media types, regardless of
whether the media was tangible or digital. These patterns repeated for both
the License Now and short notice conditions.133

Figure 18: Percentage of “Buy Now” Respondents Who Prefer Rights

Respondents expressed consistent preferences for lending, reselling, and using their device
of choice across media types.

Respondent preferences were strongly correlated with the frequency of
online shopping for media and the lending and reselling of physical media.
Respondents who regularly engaged in these activities were more likely to
score highly on the Preference Thermometer. We also saw a difference
between men and women, with men being considerably more likely to have
strong preferences for greater rights.

133 License Now respondents expressed the following preferences: lending, 54%; reselling, 34%;
and device of choice, 85%. For the short notice, preferences were slightly higher: lending, 58%;
reselling, 41%; and device of choice, 88%. These preferences did not vary significantly between media
type in either case.
Our open-ended questions offer additional support for this observation. When asked, “If you
own the [media good] you paid for, what sort of uses can you make of it?”, the number of respondents
who said they could engage in a range of activities—including lending, giving away, reselling,
consuming, and making personal uses—was consistent across notice conditions and media types.
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2. Willingness to Pay for Rights
Next we asked respondents to assign a dollar value to their preferences.
Since respondents were not spending actual money to acquire these rights,
we were deliberately conservative in our design of these questions. First, we
presented respondents with the current price of the good on Amazon and
asked how much more they would pay for the product if it came with a
particular right. In doing so, we allowed for the possibility that some
respondents may value rights but be unwilling to pay anything extra for them
on the grounds that traditional ownership rights should already be reflected
in the current price. And, in fact, many respondents who expressed strong
preferences for rights were unwilling to pay more for them.134 Second, by
asking how much more respondents would pay for these rights as opposed to
how much less they would pay if the good came without them, we hoped to
avoid the influence of the endowment effect—the well-established tendency
to overvalue objects or rights that we own.135 Finally, to discourage outliers,
we capped responses to these questions at $20.
Most digital consumers, 54%, were willing to pay more for at least one of
these three rights.136 The median overall price increase was $1, but the average
was $9.60 above the current Amazon prices. For the individual rights,
respondents were willing to pay an average of $3.54 more for the right to lend,
$3.06 for the right to resell, and $2.99 for the right to use media on their
device of choice. Taken together, this evidence suggests that rights associated
with personal property ownership influence the price of digital media goods.
More than half of our respondents were willing to pay more for those rights.
Among those who were unwilling to pay more, it is fair to conclude that many
expect those rights to be part of the bargain under existing prices.
3. Likelihood of Switching to Subscriptions and File Sharing
Finally, we were curious if the rights to lend, resell, and use the device of
choice influenced consumer decisionmaking about where and how to acquire
media. Recent years have seen declining physical and digital sales and a

134 For lending, 46% of respondents who expressed a strong preference for that right were
unwilling to pay more. For resale, that number was 45%, and for device of choice it was 60%.
135 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1342 (1990) (discussing how everyday objects increase in value as
soon as they become one’s possessions); Carey K. Morewedge et al., Bad Riddance or Good Rubbish?
Ownership and Not Loss Aversion Causes the Endowment Effect, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
947, 949 (2009) (reporting that brokers who owned mugs themselves “bought and sold mugs for
their clients at a higher price than did brokers who did not own a mug”).
136 Fifty-three percent of respondents gave a greater-than-zero answer to at least one of the
three questions.
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corresponding increase in subscription streaming in the music and movie
industries.137 Since sales are typically more profitable for rights holders and
creators than streaming services, if the absence of property rights steers
consumers towards streaming, copyright holders may be inclined to rethink
their licensing terms. That should hold doubly true for infringing downloads.
If the absence of meaningful rights in digital purchases encourages would-be
paying customers to get their content from The Pirate Bay rather than Apple
or Amazon, rights holders should take a hard look a their digital “sales” strategy.
We asked respondents if they had used or were familiar with subscription
streaming services. An overwhelming majority, 94%, answered yes. Of that
group, we asked if they would be more likely to watch a movie, listen to a
record, or read a book through a subscription service like Netflix, Spotify, or
Kindle Unlimited if they could not acquire a version of the good that allowed
lending, rental, or the use of their preferred device. Overall, 52% were more
likely to stream if they could not lend.138
That rate held steady across the four notice conditions, but was consistently
higher for movies. For resale, 43% of respondents were more likely to stream.
Again, that number held steady across notice conditions, but saw a spike for
movies.139 The ability to use the consumer’s device of choice elicited the
highest response rate, with 63% stating an increased likelihood of using a
streaming service overall; that figure jumped to 74% among movie shoppers.140
We asked a similar set of questions to the 42% of respondents who
indicated familiarity with BitTorrent, a protocol for distributed file sharing,141
and The Pirate Bay, a popular index of copyrighted material available online at
no charge.142 Although BitTorrent is frequently used for non-infringing
purposes, and even some users of The Pirate Bay are engaged in non-infringing
uses, much of the traffic associated with these two services constitutes
infringement. Based on our survey data, consumers are more likely to opt out
of lawful markets for copyrighted works and download illegally if there is no

137 See Derek Thompson, The Death of Music Sales, ATLANTIC (Jan. 25, 2015), http://www.the
atlantic.com/business/achive/2015/01/buying-music-is-so-over/384790/ [http://perma.cc/D8QZ-34ED]
(describing the decline in sales of CDs and digital music); Andrew Wallenstein, Why 2015 Home
Entertainment Figures Should Worry Studios, VARIETY (Jan. 6, 2016, 10:58 AM), http://variety.com/2016/
digital/news/home-entertainment-spending-2015-studios-1201673329/ [http://perma.cc/xw8Z-H898]
(noting that “subscription streaming increased by a whopping 25%” in both 2014 and 2015).
138 For books, 48% were more likely to stream; for music, 47%; and for movies, 61%.
139 For movies, 54% were more likely to stream; for books, 40%; and for music, 36%.
140 For both books and music, 57% reported an increased likelihood of streaming.
141 See About BitTorrent, BITTORRENT, http://www.bittorrent.com/company/about [https://perma.
cc/XXF5-LTYM] (explaining that BitTorrent’s protocols “keep creators and consumers in control of
their content and data” and “move as much as 40% of the world’s Internet traffic on a daily basis”).
142 See About, PIRATE BAY, https://thepiratebay.org/about [https://perma.cc/CE36-KCHS] (describing
the website as “the worlds [sic] largest bittorrent indexer,” which is available for use “free of charge”).
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lawful way to obtain the rights to lend, resell, and use those copies on their
device of choice. Thirty-two percent of respondents were more likely to
download files without paying in the absence of a right to lend; 31% were
more likely to do so in the absence of a right to resell; and 40% in the absence
of a right to use their device of choice.143
Not surprisingly, we observed a correlation between the strength of
respondents’ preferences for these rights and the likelihood that they would
subscribe to a streaming service or download illegally in the absence of those
rights. Perhaps more troublingly for rights holders and retailers, we also
observed a strong correlation between the frequency of online media
acquisition and both of these alternative avenues. Those who shop online for
media either frequently or very frequently were considerably more likely to
switch to subscription streaming or illegal downloads.
The MediaShop study establishes that a sizable number of digital media
consumers misunderstand the rights they acquire when they Buy Now. Those
misperceptions are in large part a function of the ubiquitous use of language
borrowed from familiar transactions involving tangible goods, but our study
strongly suggests that those misperceptions can be corrected through clear
and conspicuous short notices. Finally, the study supports the conclusion that
the rights to lend, resell, and use media goods on a consumer’s device of
choice are important to consumers’ purchasing decisions. In the next Section,
we consider the legal implications of these empirical findings.
IV. FALSE AND DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING
For the market to function efficiently, the public needs to be able to rely on
the claims of manufacturers and retailers about the products and services they
offer. Putting the burden on consumers to independently investigate every claim

143 In recent months, we have seen some indirect evidence of this phenomenon. When Kanye
West released his latest album, The Life of Pablo, as an exclusive on Tidal, a streaming service, he
announced, “My album will never never never be on Apple. And it will never be for sale . . . . You
can only get it on Tidal.” Kanye West (@kanyewest), TWITTER (Feb. 15, 2016, 6:34 PM), https://
twitter.com/kanyewest/status/699376240709402624 [https://perma.cc/4GW5-LGJE]. A day later,
the album passed half a million downloads by BitTorrent users alone. Nathan McAlone, Kanye West’s
New Album Has Already Gone Pirate ‘Gold’ with 500,000 Illegal Downloads in a Single Day, BUS. INSIDER:
TECH INSIDER (Feb. 16, 2016, 12:38 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/kanye-wests-album-wentgold-with-500000-downloads-in-just-24-hours-if-were-talking-about-illegal-2016-2 [https://perma.cc/
2G8R-72PU]. West soon retreated from his emphatic position, but the album still has yet to see a
physical release. See Peter Helman, Kanye West’s Updated The Life of Pablo Is Now on Apple Music
and Spotify, STEREOGUM (Mar. 30, 2016, 10:06 PM), http://www.stereogum.com/1868554/kanyewests-updated-the-life-of-pablo-will-reportedly-be-on-apple-music-and-spotify-this-friday/news [https://
perma.cc/L4N9-6F5M] (announcing that two of the album’s tracks were available on streaming services
other than Tidal and that the rest of the album was expected to follow that week).
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about price, quality, performance, and other central characteristics introduces
massive information costs. It also leaves consumers vulnerable to abuse.
Although precise information about the digital revenues of retailers like
Apple and Amazon is hard to come by, publicly available data suggest that
deception in this space costs consumers billions of dollars a year. Apple’s
revenue in fiscal year 2015 totaled more than $233 billion.144 Of that amount,
8.8%, or $18.7 billion, was attributable to its services division, which includes
the iTunes Store, the App Store, the Mac App Store, the iBooks Store,
AppleCare, Apple Pay, and other services.145 Amazon brought in $107 billion
in revenue in 2015,146 an estimated $7.9 billion of which can be traced to digital
content.147 Estimating conservatively, if the deceptive Buy Now button is
responsible for just 10% of the price of digital goods, consumer deception
results in as much as $2.5 billion in overpayments to these two retailers alone
every year. And that figure ignores any indirect revenue the illusion of
ownership contributes to sales of related hardware, like iPhones and Kindles.
Putting the magnitude of damages aside, marketing language that
misleads consumers about the nature of goods or services can trigger liability
under both state and federal law. In this Section, we outline those legal theories,
their application to the Buy Now button, and their limitations.148 Ultimately,
we conclude that although private causes of action offer consumers a promising
144 See Apple’s Global Revenue from 1st Quarter 2005 to 3rd Quarter 2016 (In Billion U.S. Dollars),
STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/263426/apples-global-revenue-since-1st-quarter-2005 [https:

//perma.cc/AG46-MJ9A] (tracking Apple’s quarterly revenues from 2005 to 2016).
145 See Share of Apple’s Revenue by Product Category from the First Quarter of 2012 to the Second
Quarter of 2016, STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/382260/segments-share-revenue-of-apple
[https://perma.cc/4MQH-39GC] (reporting the share of Apple’s quarterly revenues in 2015 coming
from its “Services” as 6.43%, 8.61%, 10.14%, and 9.88%, for an average of 8.8%).
146 See Press Release, Amazon.com, Amazon.com Announces Fourth Quarter Sales Up 22% to
$35.7 Billion (Jan. 28, 2016), http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9NjA3O
TE1fENoaWxkSUQ9MzIxMDI4fFR5cGU9MQ==&t=1 [https://perma.cc/N6D6-Z6QE] (reporting
that “[n]et sales increased 20% to $107.0 billion” in 2015).
147 See Mark Hoelzel & Emily Adler, The Kindle Fire Is Giving a Big Boost to Amazon’s Revenues
from Digital Media, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 26, 2014, 12:15 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/a-lookat-amazons-kindle-ecosystem-4-2014-2 [https://perma.cc/DRT6-B7KN] (showing graphically the
revenue that the Amazon Kindle brought in from digital media).
148 We limit our discussion to applicable United States law. However, European consumer
protection law may very well provide a parallel avenue for enforcement. Although no cases sounding in
false or deceptive advertising have been brought yet, cases in Germany and France have challenged
restrictions on consumers’ ability to resell digital video games on contract grounds. See Jon Fingas, Lawsuit
Demands the Right to Resell Steam Games, ENGADGET (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.engadget.com/2015/12/21
/lawsuit-demands-steam-resales [https://perma.cc/NV65-PDVM] (announcing that a French consumer
group was suing a company for the right to resell its downloadable games); Jeffrey Matulef, Court Favours
Valve in Not Allowing Digital Content Resells, EUROGAMER.NET (July 2, 2014), http://www.eurogamer.
net/articles/2014-02-07-court-favours-valve-in-not-allowing-digital-content-resells [https://perma.cc/2U9Y
-S23S] (reporting that “[t]he Regional Court of Berlin decision ha[d] dismissed” a consumer group’s
lawsuit contesting a company’s EULA that forbade reselling digital content).
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avenue for increasing the quality of information about digital goods, public
regulatory enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission is likely necessary
to fully address the concerns that our study reveals.
A. State Claims
All states have their own Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices
(UDAP) statutes, sometimes referred to as “little FTC acts.”149 In addition,
many states have both common law and statutory protections in place against
false advertising. The result is a web of overlapping regimes to address unfair
and deceptive business practices. In California, for example, the Unfair
Competition Law bans “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or
practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.”150 In
addition, the state’s False Advertising Law prohibits the publication in
advertising of “any statement . . . which is untrue or misleading, and which is
known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be
untrue or misleading.”151 And its Consumer Legal Remedies Act identifies a
list of twenty-seven “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices,” including “[r]epresenting that a transaction confers or
involves rights, remedies, or obligations which it does not have or involve.”152
Although the precise formulation of these prohibitions differs between
states, they are generally satisfied by proof of a false or misleading statement
about a product that is material to consumers. The results of the MediaShop
study offer strong empirical support that Buy Now buttons are both misleading
and material to consumers. Nonetheless, there are a number of legal and
practical hurdles facing private plaintiffs alleging false or deceptive advertising.
First, many online retailers include arbitration provisions in their terms
of use that purport to deny consumers the ability to seek redress in court.
While not all major retailers rely on arbitration clauses,153 many powerhouse
online retailers do. For example, Amazon includes the following language in
its terms of use:

149 For a high-level summary of these laws, see generally CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER
LAW CTR., A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES (2009),
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/car_sales/UDAP_Report_Feb09.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WP3-2N6H],
which evaluates the effectiveness of various state UDAP statutes in providing protection for consumers.
150 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2016).
151 Id. § 17500.
152 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770 (West 2016).
153 Notably, Apple does not include such terms in its iTunes agreement. See Apple Media
Services Terms and Conditions, supra note 14 (preserving the ability of consumers to file suit given its
lack of a binding arbitration clause).
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Any dispute or claim relating in any way to your use of any Amazon Service, or
to any products or services sold or distributed by Amazon or through
Amazon.com will be resolved by binding arbitration, rather than in court, except
that you may assert claims in small claims court if your claims qualify . . . .
We each agree that any dispute resolution proceedings will be conducted only on
an individual basis and not in a class, consolidated, or representative action . . . .154

California courts have pushed back against sweeping arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts by deeming them unconscionable.155 However, the
Supreme Court held that such an application of state contract law stands as an
obstacle to the policies Congress meant to implement in the Federal
Arbitration Act.156 And just last year, the Court held that lower courts cannot
invalidate class arbitration clauses on the basis of costs that exceed plaintiffs’
likely recovery.157 Those five-justice majority opinions—both authored by
Justice Scalia—prompted vigorous dissents and may well be revisited in a
future term.158
As the law stands, arbitration clauses can still be invalidated “upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”159 So
arguments rooted in fraud, duress, or unconscionability unrelated to arbitration
provisions are still available to consumer plaintiffs seeking to bypass
arbitration. But one recent false advertising claim brought against Amazon was
removed from federal court by virtue of the Amazon arbitration provision.160

154 Conditions of Use, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/?node
Id=508088 [https://perma.cc/PK9Y-7AS5] (last updated June 21, 2016).
155 See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005) (holding that class action
waivers are unconscionable when “found in a consumer contract of adhesion . . . involv[ing] small
amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has
. . . deliberately cheat[ed] large numbers of consumers . . . to the extent the obligation is governed
by California law.”); see also Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 983-84
(9th Cir. 2007) (finding the defendant’s “class arbitration clause . . . both procedurally and
substantively unconscionable” and thus unenforceable).
156 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343 (2011) (“A federal statute’s saving
clause ‘cannot in reason be construed as [allowing] a common law right, the continued existence of
which would be absolutely inconsistent with the provisions of the act . . . . [T]he act cannot be held
to destroy itself.’” (alteration in original)).
157 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (rejecting respondents’
argument that individual litigation of their claims would violate antitrust policy, holding that “the
antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim”).
158 See generally Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 357
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
159 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
160 See Fagerstrom v. Amazon.com, Inc., 141 F.Supp. 3d 1051, 1073-74 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (submitting
plaintiffs’ claims to arbitration on the grounds that Amazon’s arbitration clause was neither illusory
nor unconscionable).
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More promisingly, arbitration clauses are ineffective when no agreement
has been formed. Two recent cases—one from the California Court of
Appeal161 and another from the Seventh Circuit162—illustrate the growing
sensitivity of courts to the implications of automatic contract formation
coupled with arbitration clauses that deny consumers effective legal redress. In
both cases, the courts held that where an arbitration clause is “buried”163 in
terms of service that are linked to or referenced on a page the consumer visits,
but not directly presented in a manner that “get[s] the message through” that
the consumer is agreeing to an arbitration agreement, 164 those terms “are not
sufficiently conspicuous”165 to form the basis of an enforceable agreement.
More recently, the Second Circuit questioned the enforceability of
Amazon’s own arbitration clause after the plaintiff in a putative class action
alleging violations of the Consumer Product Safety Act argued that notice of
the terms was insufficient.166 As the court explained, Amazon customers were
“not required to click an ‘I agree’ box after being presented with a list of terms
and conditions”; instead they were “asked to click on a ‘Place your order’
button after being told elsewhere on the page that ‘By placing your order, you
agree to Amazon.com’s privacy notice and conditions of use,’ with the latter
phrase hyperlinked to the [Amazon] Conditions of Use.’”167 If courts follow
this line of reasoning, arbitration provisions buried in hyperlinked terms of
service may function more like speed bumps rather than true barriers to
individual and class action lawsuits.
Even if consumers can avoid arbitration, because of the small recovery due
to any individual plaintiff, Buy Now false advertising cases are probably viable
only to the extent they can leverage the class action mechanism.168 For a class
to be certified, a court must be convinced that the suit satisfies a number of
requirements. The class must be “so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable.”169 With millions of potential class members, this requirement is
161 See Long v. Provide Commerce, Inc., 200 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117, 123-27 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016)
(holding that users did not assent to the terms contained in hyperlinked terms of use agreement because
the hyperlink failed to put “a reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of the terms of the contract”).
162 See Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1034-35 (7th Cir. 2016) (acknowledging
that contracts formed on the Internet require a fact-intensive inquiry into “whether the
circumstances support the assumption that the purchaser receives reasonable notice of [the terms
and conditions of the agreement]”).
163 Id. at 1033.
164 Id. at 1036.
165 Long, 200 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 123.
166 See Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 15-423-CV, 2016 WL 4473225, at *8 (2d Cir. Aug. 25,
2016) (holding that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff ’s claim on the basis of Amazon’s
arbitration clause).
167 Id. at *9.
168 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
169 Id. 23(a)(1).
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easily satisfied. Next, there must be “questions of law or fact common to the
class.”170 Typically, this requires only a single common significant question of
fact or law.171 Since the impact of the same Buy Now button—language all
consumers encountered—is at issue for each class member, the commonality
requirement can be satisfied.172 Potentially more problematic, however, is the
requirement of predominance—that the questions common among class
members predominate over questions that affect individual class members.
Given the substantive differences between state laws, it may be difficult to
certify a national class in a Buy Now case.173 Some state statutes include scienter
requirements;174 others do not.175 Some states require a showing of reliance;176
others do not.177 Available remedies also vary between states.178
Although there are considerable hurdles facing private plaintiffs, there is
good reason to suspect that state-wide class actions could succeed, particularly
in the absence of an arbitration clause. But even if individual plaintiffs could
recover, a more uniform solution may be preferable given the national and
indeed international scope of markets for digital goods.
B. Federal Claims
There are two available avenues for federal claims concerning the Buy Now
button: the Lanham Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act. Neither
provides remedies for individual consumers, but the FTC Act may nonetheless
provide policy tools to address misleading advertising in digital sales.
1. The Lanham Act
The Lanham Act is best known as the source of federal trademark protection.
But it also prohibits the use of “any . . . false or misleading description of fact . . . in
Id. 23(a)(2).
See Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 666 F.3d 581, 589 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that
the question of whether a car manufacturer had a duty to disclose certain facts was common to the
whole class of consumers even though different customers had viewed different advertisements).
172 See Cabral v. Supple LLC, 608 F. App’x. 482, 483 (9th Cir. 2015) (vacating a class
certification on the grounds that not all class members saw the same allegedly false advertisement).
173 See Mazza, 666 F.3d at 594 (refusing to certify a national false advertising class because
“each class member’s . . . claim should be governed by the . . . laws of the jurisdiction in which the
transaction [in question] took place”).
174 See CARTER, supra note 149, at 17 (explaining that while “[m]ost states do not require the
state agency to prove the business’s intent or knowledge,” Colorado, Indiana, Nevada, North Dakota,
and Wyoming do under certain circumstances).
175 Id.
176 See id. at 20 (“Some states require the consumer to show . . . that the consumer specifically
relied on the [unfair or deceptive] practice.”).
177 Id.
178 See id. at 7-10 (offering a comparison of the remedies available to consumers in all fifty states).
170
171

2017]

What We Buy When We Buy Now

367

commercial advertising or promotion [that] misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin” of goods or services.179 On its face,
the statute creates broad standing for private claims challenging false advertising.
It allows “any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged
by such act” to sue for damages.180 While this language would suggest that
the Lanham Act is a viable vehicle for consumer claims, courts have limited
standing to competitors or others with a commercial interest implicated by
the allegedly false statements.181 Consumers, even though they are most
directly harmed by false claims about the products they buy, are barred from
challenging them under the Lanham Act.182
Concerned about “a veritable flood of claims brought in already overtaxed
federal district courts,”183 courts argue that competitors are in a better
position to vindicate consumer interests than consumers themselves.184
Competitors, these courts reason, have greater resources and financial
incentives to target false advertising, so we should expect them to vigorously
pursue such claims.

179 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012). Courts interpreted section 43(a) as creating a claim for false
advertising. See Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and False Advertising
Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1309-13 (2011) (offering a brief discussion of early false advertising cases
under the Lanham Act). Although not all courts were quick to reach that conclusion, they eventually
reached something approaching a consensus. With the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Congress
codified the prevailing judicial reading, dividing section 43(a) into two subsections. The first
establishes liability for the infringement of unregistered marks and trade dress. The second creates
claims for false advertising and product disparagement. See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 132, 102 Stat. 3935, 3946 (1988) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012)).
180 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
181 See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1391-93 (2014)
(considering the approaches of various circuit courts and concluding that “a plaintiff suing under
§ 1125(a) ordinarily must show economic or reputational injury flowing directly from the deception
wrought by the defendant’s advertising; and that that occurs when deception of consumers causes
them to withhold trade from the plaintiff. That showing is generally not made when the deception
produces injuries to a fellow commercial actor that in turn affect the plaintiff ”).
182 See id. at 1390 (explaining that “[a] consumer who is hoodwinked into purchasing a
disappointing product may well have an injury-in-fact cognizable under Article III, but he cannot invoke
the protection of the Lanham Act—a conclusion reached by every Circuit to consider the question”).
183 Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 693 (2d Cir. 1971). Courts have
expressed similar concerns for well over a century. See, e.g., N.Y. & R. Cement Co. v. Coplay Cement Co.,
44 F. 277, 278 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1890) (warning against “open[ing] a Pandora’s box of vexatious litigation”).
184 See Coca-Cola Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 822 F.2d 28, 31 (6th Cir. 1987) (“[C]ompetitors
have the greatest interest in stopping misleading advertising, and . . . section 43(a) allows those
parties with the greatest interest in enforcement, and in many situations with the greatest resources
to devote to a lawsuit, to enforce the statute rigorously.”); Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co.,
720 F. Supp. 194, 212 (D.D.C. 1989) (“While the Act is not directly available to consumers, it is
nevertheless designed to protect consumers, by giving the cause of action to competitors who are
prepared to vindicate the injury caused to consumers.” (citation omitted)), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part,
913 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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Sometimes that is true, but not always. Companies make the expensive
decision to litigate only if they think it will give them a competitive advantage.
If the Buy Now button leads to increased revenue compared to alternatives,
competitors—even if they know the language is misleading—face strong
incentives to use it. If consumers remain unaware of the deception, there is
little competitive upside to pioneering new marketing language. For retailers
who already use the standard language, a challenge could open them up to
potential legal liability or public criticism for their past use of it. Also, new
entrants into the concentrated digital media market may question how much
their bottom lines will benefit from even a successful suit.
Of course, there are reasons to suspect individuals would be reluctant to
challenge false advertising too. Aside from the most expensive purchases, the
harm to a single person caused by a false ad is just too small to justify the
time and expense of a lawsuit. Class actions could solve that problem by
bundling together the claims of similarly situated consumers in a single case,
but without standing, that option remains off the table as a matter of federal
false advertising law.
2. The Federal Trade Commission Act
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is empowered by Congress through
the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) to prevent the use of “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”185 Unfairness and
deception are separate legal theories under which plaintiffs can allege a violation
of the FTCA. Given the vagueness of Congress’s statutory mandate, the FTC
released two policy statements in the 1980s to define the contours of deception
and unfairness: the FTC Policy Statement on Deception186 and the FTC Policy
Statement on Unfairness.187 The Policy Statement on Deception sets forth three
key elements of a deception case: there must be (1) “a representation, omission,
or practice that is likely to mislead a consumer”; (2) the interpretation of that
act or practice is examined based on the perspective of a reasonable consumer;
and (3) “the representation, omission, or practice must be ‘material.’”188

15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
See FTC Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 132, at app. at 174-84 (outlining the
FTC’s “enforcement policy against deceptive acts or practices”).
187 See Letter from Michael Pertschuk, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n et al., to Wendell H.
Ford, Chairman, Consumer Subcomm., Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp. & John C. Danforth,
Ranking Minority Member, Consumer Subcomm., Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp. (Dec. 17,
1980), reprinted in Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 app. at 1070-76 (1984) [hereinafter FTC Policy
Statement on Unfairness] (outlining the FTC’s approach to “the concept of consumer unfairness”).
188 See FTC Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 132, at app. at 175.
185
186
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Under the FTC’s policy and case law, the Buy Now button and alternatives
we tested would qualify as representations to the consumer.189 Our study
speaks to the more nuanced problems of the representation’s propensity to
mislead a “reasonable” consumer and the representation’s materiality. A 1983
FTC policy statement imposes a “reasonable consumer” standard, and, over
time, the agency has established criteria for evaluating whether a representation
is misleading to the “reasonable” consumer.190 The FTC weighs the clarity of
the representation, whether there is conspicuous information that qualifies
the representation, and whether the representation has omitted important
information.191 As one FTC official explained,
A company’s marketing materials must be consistent with the nature of the
product being offered. It’s not enough to disclose the information only in a
fine print of a lengthy online user agreement . . . . [I]f your advertising giveth
and your EULA [license agreement] taketh away don’t be surprised if the
FTC comes calling.192

In a series of investigations and enforcement actions over the past decade,
the FTC has indicated that when retailers deprive consumers of the right to
make reasonably expected use of digital media, those retailers may be engaged
in deceptive behavior. In 2006, the FTC investigated Sony BMG for selling CDs
that surreptitiously installed malicious software onto consumers’ computers.193
Among the many ways this software harmed consumers, it prevented consumers
from making copies of their CDs and only permitted them to transfer the data
on their CDs to devices that used particular file formats—namely, secure
Windows Media or Sony ATRAC files.194 Consumers who refused to install
189 The FTC recently confirmed that a button characterizing a transaction constitutes a factual
representation to consumers about the nature of that transaction. See Decision and Order at 3, Apple
Inc., No. C-4444 (F.T.C. Mar. 25, 2014) (describing the FTC’s settlement with Apple over the
latter’s failure to disclose that a user’s approval of a single in-app purchase automatically authorized
all other purchases made in the fifteen minutes following the initial authorization); see also Redacted
Order Granting Amazon’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Granting the FTC’s Motion
for Summary Judgment at 18, FTC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C14-1038-JCC (W.D. Wash. Apr. 26,
2016) (concluding that Amazon’s use of buttons labeled “Free,” which automatically authorized
future in-app purchases, was deceptive).
190 See FTC Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 132, at app. at 178; see also
HOOFNAGLE, supra note 122, at 125-28 (describing the FTC’s attempt “to ground the Commission’s
analysis in reasonable interpretations of a practice”).
191 See FTC Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 132, at app. at 175 n.4.
192 Bruce Schneier, Do You Know Where Your Data Are?, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2009, 11:59 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123997522418329223 [https://perma.cc/(8)8-KM58].
193 See Deirdre K. Mulligan & Aaron K. Perzanowski, The Magnificence of the Disaster:
Reconstructing the Sony BMG Rootkit Incident, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1211 (2007) (describing
the FTC’s “response to the flawed notice and consent provisions of Sony BMG’s DRM”).
194 See id. at 1166-77 (discussing how the software created several security vulnerabilities and
improperly collected data).
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the software could not play the CDs on their computers altogether. In its order,
the Commission required Sony BMG to provide clear and prominent prepurchase notice to consumers of these unexpected restrictions.195
After the Sony BMG incident, the FTC opened three section five
investigations in response to threats by other digital media retailers to
deactivate the servers necessary for consumers to authorize playback devices.
If those servers had been deactivated, consumers would have been unable to
transfer and play their digital media purchases on a new computer or device.
But the three retailers that were investigated—Microsoft,196 Walmart, 197 and
Major League Baseball198—all backed down from their publicly announced
plans in the face of FTC scrutiny.199 As the Commission explained, it has a
duty to ensure,
In the context of sales of digital products, that consumers are provided
sufficient information prior to purchase so that they understand any inherent

195 See Decision and Order at 3-5, Sony BMG Music Entertainment, No. C-4195 (F.T.C. June
28, 2007) (laying out the various disclosures Sony was required to make).
196 See Letter from Mary Koelbel Engle, Assoc. Dir., Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Charles E.
Buffon, Covington & Burling LLP (Sept. 30, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/closing_letters/microsoft-corporation-msn-music/080930msnmusicclosingletter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZA3Y-7P45] [hereinafter FTC Opinion Letter to Microsoft] (closing the FTC
investigations into Microsoft’s threatened actions).
197 See Letter from Mary Koelbel Engle, Assoc. Dir., Fed. Trade Comm’n, to M. Sean Royall,
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP (June 23, 2010), https://ww.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documentsclosingletters/wal-mart-stores-inc./100623walmartletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZCB-6Q47] [hereinafter FTC Opinion
Letter to Walmart] (explaining that the FTC would not be recommending enforcement action).
198 See Letter from Mary Koelbel Engle, Assoc. Dir., Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Randal M.
Shaheen, Arnold & Porter LLP (Oct. 9, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
closing_letters/mlb-advanced-media-l.p./081009mlbamclosingletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/B69Y-K9Q7]
[hereinafter FTC Opinion Letter to MLB] (declining to recommend enforcement action).
199 See FTC Opinion Letter to Microsoft, supra note 196, at 2 (noting that “[i]n June 2008,
. . . Microsoft announced that it had reversed its decision”); FTC Opinion Letter to MLB, supra note
198, at 3 (discussing the “MLBAM’s discontinuation of [certain] advertising” and the “accommodations
that MLBAM [was] making to its customers” who were affected by DRM limits); FTC Opinion Letter
to Walmart, supra note 197, at 2 (noting that Walmart “had reversed its decision to shut down the
DRM servers”). The tension between consumer expectations of ownership and actual technological
capabilities extends beyond digital media to a range of so-called “smart” devices. In 2016, the FTC
launched an investigation into Nest’s decision to remotely disable the Revolv, a $300 home
automation hub sold to consumers. The Commission “was concerned that reasonable consumers
would not expect the Revolv hubs to become unusable due to Revolv Inc.’s actions, and that
unilaterally rendering the devices inoperable would cause unjustified, substantial consumer injury
that consumers themselves could not reasonably avoid.” Letter from Mary Koelbel Engle, Assoc.
Dir., Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Richard J. Lutton, Head of Legal & Regulatory Affairs, Nest Labs,
Inc. 2 (July 7, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/closing-letters/nid/160707nestrevo
lveletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TXV-BGFH] [hereinafter FTC Opinion Letter to Nest Labs].
After Nest committed to providing consumers full refunds, the FTC closed its investigation. See id.
(explaining that, due in part to “Nest’s practice of providing full refunds,” the FTC had concluded
that “no further action [was] warranted”).
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limitations on the use of the product they buy . . . . Boilerplate disclosures in
lengthy Terms & Conditions or End User License Agreements may be
insufficient to apprise consumers of important limitations on their purchases,
particularly if the limitations may lead to an inability to view or listen to
content in the future.200

In its investigation into Major League Baseball’s public threat to disable
its servers, the Commission appeared particularly concerned by MLB’s prior
representations “that consumers would ‘own’ the Downloads.”201 MLB
marketing materials stressed that consumers would “OWN complete game
downloads from this year or yesteryear” and encouraged consumers to “[o]wn
today’s games and yesterday’s classics.”202 The FTC argued that such claims
could “cause reasonable consumers to believe that they had the ability to play
the content on a potentially unlimited number of compatible devices, or could
otherwise use and dispose of the copy consistent with how consumers can use
and dispose of other copies of copyrighted works that they own.”203
Although we share the FTC’s worry, we note that the Commission did not
appear to use survey data to determine what inferences a reasonable consumer
might draw from claims of ownership. In contrast, the FTC has relied on
survey evidence to assess misleadingness, accepting varying levels of proof to
establish deception.204 Today, if the FTC finds that a practice misleads a
“significant minority”—ten or fifteen percent—of customers, 205 the practice is
deceptive.206 The willingness of courts to find deception in light of this relatively
low incidence of misleadingness implicitly acknowledges that advertisements are
See FTC Opinion Letter to MLB, supra note 198, at 2-3 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 3.
While historically the FTC found deception even when less than ten percent of consumers
were misled, over time the Commission began to look for higher percentages of deceived consumers.
See Ivan L. Preston & Jef I. Richards, Consumer Miscomprehension as a Challenge to FTC Prosecutions
of Deceptive Advertising, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 605, 610-13 (1986) (noting that after some “early
cases . . . the percentage supporting findings of violations became typically higher”).
205 See POM Wonderful, LLC v. FTC, 777 F.3d 478, 490 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“The Commission
‘examines the overall net impression’ left by an ad, and considers whether ‘at least a significant
minority of reasonable consumers’ would ‘likely’ interpret the ad to assert the claim.” (internal
citations omitted)); see also Telebrands Corp. v. FTC, 457 F.3d 354, 359 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that a
company seriously and deliberately misled consumers with its “expensive, nationwide . . . [and] highly
successful” advertising campaign).
206 See Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 290
F.3d 578, 594 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[W]e believe that survey evidence demonstrating that 15% of the respondents
were misled . . . is sufficient to establish . . . [a] claim for false or misleading advertising . . . .”); Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 246, 249 (6th Cir. 1973) (affirming the FTC’s finding of
deception when an ad “misled 15% (or 10%) of the buying public”); Telebrands Corp. v. Media Grp.,
Inc., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1342, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that a survey showing that 20% of
consumers were misled was sufficient evidence to show deception).
200
201
202
203
204
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often susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation—and where one of
those interpretations is misleading, the advertiser is liable. This judicial
tendency also reflects the fact that false advertising law is not intended to protect
only the savvy or the skeptical, but also “that vast multitude which includes the
ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous.”207
Once we know consumers are being misled, the question turns to whether
or not those inaccuracies are material to their choices. Would they have
behaved differently had they known the truth? Perhaps they would have
refused to buy the product, would have only purchased it for a lower price, or
would have preferred an alternative.208 Materiality can be presumed for
claims the seller expressly states or intentionally conveys, as well as for claims
relating to a product’s cost, central characteristics, purpose, performance, or
health and safety. A strong argument can be made that the rights suggested
by the Buy Now button are just as material: an ebook that you can keep forever
is a very different product than one that can disappear without notice.
Even if those rights are not presumptively material, the FTC determines
the importance of claims by analyzing surveys, credible testimony of
consumers, and whether the claim involves a feature that alters the price of the
product. Here, our survey points to materiality in two respects—an expressed
preference for the ability to use digital media in ways similar to physical books,
music, and movies, and an expressed willingness to pay more for these features.
The FTC does not require evidence that the consumers who are deceived
are the same as the consumers to whom false or misleading claims are
material. Yet, in most cases where deception and materiality are established,
it is safe to assume that a substantial number of consumers are misled about
claims that are material to them. Our data demonstrate that with respect to
the Buy Now button, this assumption is well-founded. Many respondents who
expressed misperceptions about their rights valued their rights highly. For
example, of the 519 respondents with Rights Scores of 2 or less, more than
40% expressed a strong preference for ownership rights.
Having shown their propensity to mislead reasonable consumers in
material respects, it is clear that the FTCA’s deception theory could be
employed against the practices described in this Article. We now briefly turn
to the FTC’s other main theory of liability: unfairness. Unfairness is a more
controversial legal theory that has been pruned back by Congress after the
Commission used it to police a series of powerful economic actors—companies
207 Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 679 (2d Cir. 1944); see id.
(upholding an FTC decision that a “rejuvenating” face cream was deceptively marketed, despite the
manufacturer’s claim that “no straight-thinking person could believe that its cream would actually
rejuvenate”); see also Giant Food, Inc. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 977, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (“The Act was not
intended to protect ‘sophisticates.’”).
208 See FTC Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 132.
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that advertised to kids, funeral parlor directors, and used car salesmen.209 Today,
the FTC uses a three-prong test to establish unfairness. For a consumer injury
to be unfair, it must be (1) substantial; (2) not outweighed by countervailing
benefits to competition or consumers produced by the practice; and (3)
reasonably unavoidable.210
Substantial injuries to consumers usually—but not always—involve
monetary harm, coercion into the purchase of unwanted goods or services,
and health or safety risks.211 Substantial injury may also occur where a
business practice causes a small harm to a large number of people. Our data
suggest that an unfairness theory would be based on this last factor: the idea
that a large number of consumers suffer a financial detriment based upon
receiving a different product—and one that came with significantly fewer
rights—than they thought they would.
If the FTC finds an injury to consumers, the unfairness test suggests that
the FTC should weigh the injury against its potential benefits and also
determine whether the consumer could have avoided the injury by shopping
elsewhere. Here, a digital goods company could argue that communicating
more nuanced information to consumers imposes significant costs that are
avoided by simple disclosures such as Buy Now. But the low cost of
implementing a short notice provision undercuts that assertion. Retailers might
also argue that consumers could avoid the harm done to them by reverting to
analog copies and avoiding the pitfalls of digital products altogether. But pointing
to related products that do not leverage unfair practices is an unconvincing
response to ongoing consumer harm, particularly since consumers are often
unaware of the differences between digital and analog goods.
The FTC could reasonably rely on either its deception or unfairness
authority to pursue the use of Buy Now buttons. Between the two, deception
appears to be the more natural fit, particularly because the unfairness theory
raises potentially fact-intensive questions about the substantiality of the
injury to consumers and the efficiency benefits of simple disclosures. Since
unfairness offers no additional remedies, in all likelihood, if the FTC were to
police these practices, it would proceed on a deception theory only.

209 Cf. HOOFNAGLE, supra note 122, at 133 (discussing how “the FTC found that” practices of
certain used car salesmen “violated clearly established public policy”).
210 See FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, supra note 187, app. at 1073 (describing the “three
tests” that a practice must satisfy to be found unfair).
211 See id. (describing the types of injuries the Commission typically considers substantial).
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3. The FTC Policy Approach to Buy Now
Like the Lanham Act, the FTCA lacks a private right of action.212
Nonetheless, the FTC may be the best policy option for addressing the
deficits between consumer perceptions and the realities of digital goods.
Whereas competitors have incentives not to sue under the Lanham Act,213 the
FTC has long intervened when entire markets engage in some deceptive
practice. The FTC is empowered to sue, both to prevent this kind of
widespread market deception214 and also to selectively enforce the law against
a single company, even where competitors engage in the same practices.215
Not only does the FTC have the power to address these activities, it has
fact-finding and investigative authority that could further elucidate the
problems in digital goods marketing.216 Companies, especially online ones,
extensively test their websites and marketing representations to increase
sales.217 The FTC’s broad investigative authorities could be used to obtain
surveys or other internal-facing research performed by companies on
consumers’ perceptions of Buy Now.
Finally, the FTC’s processes could guide policy through two different
mechanisms. First, the FTC’s enforcement actions are similar to a common
law process. In the privacy realm, Daniel J. Solove and Woodrow Hartzog
have praised the FTC’s approach as an incrementalist, case-by-case approach
to difficult consumer protection problems.218 The FTC, unburdened by the
hurdles that face private plaintiffs and some of the pathologies of civil
212 See, e.g., Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279, 280 (9th Cir. 1973) (“The protection
against unfair trade practices afforded by the [FTCA] vests initial remedial power solely in the
Federal Trade Commission.”).
213 See Aaron Perzanowski, Unbranding, Confusion, and Deception, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3536 (2010) (highlighting that when multiple competitors in an industry make a false claim, no
company has an incentive to sue another and put a stop to the practice).
214 See FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 US 483, 493 (1922) (“The fact that misrepresentation
and misdescription have become so common in [the market] . . . does not prevent their use being
an unfair method of competition.”).
215 See Johnson Prods. Co. v. FTC, 549 F.2d 35, 41 (7th Cir. 1977) (affirming the FTC’s authority
to target a single firm based on an industry-wide practice); Ger-Ro-Mar, Inc. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 33, 35
(2d Cir. 1975) (“[W]hile petitioners may be unfortunate in being the first target of the Commission
with respect to the selling practices in question, the Commission is under no obligation to start
simultaneous suits against all alleged offenders and it did not abuse its discretion in any sense . . . .”).
216 See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority,
FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority
[https://perma.cc/XJ5K-5LSV] (explaining the FTC’s enforcement powers).
217 See e.g., Jeff Oxford, 6 Things Online Retailers Can Learn from Amazon, FORBES (Sept. 24,
2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2013/09/24/6-things-online-retailers-can-learn
-from-amazon/#3ae599553b85 [https://perma.cc/P8HG-HRKV] (noting that Amazon conducts tests
on various facets of its website in order to increase sales).
218 See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 144
COLUM. L. REV. 583, 648-49 (2014) (discussing patterns of development in FTC privacy enforcement).
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litigation, can set norms through carefully selected cases.219 These cases are,
in turn, relied upon by corporate counsel to define the boundaries between
responsible and irresponsible conduct.220
Second, the FTC can shape policy through public workshops, a quasilegislative process which would provide the Commission with a way to police
the sale of digital goods without resorting to litigation. Because the dominant
firms are mainstream and reputable actors, the FTC could use such
workshops to establish norms for the sale of digital goods while incorporating
the views of the industry, consumers, and academic experts in marketing and
economics. These perspectives could help the FTC fill the legislative gaps in
many consumer protection issues that escape the attention of Congress.
For these reasons, we think the FTC offers an attractive remedy to bridge
the gulf between the realities of the digital marketplace and consumers’
perceptions. The FTC could bring the most relevant actors to the table to
develop a more effective set of disclosures and rules. The FTC could then use
its enforcement powers to police the digital media companies that continue
to use misleading marketing methods.
CONCLUSION
In a recent article, Professor Lauren Willis argued that firms should be
required to periodically demonstrate, through third-party testing, that their
customers understand the material terms of transactions.221 Willis’s approach
recognizes that consumer understanding changes over time and is sensitive
to context. In that spirit, our study has revealed the degree to which
consumers are misled by the use of marketing language like the Buy Now
button that relies on expectations developed in the tangible goods economy,
but which are incompatible with the restrictive license terms that are attached
to most digital media transactions. We have argued that use of the Buy Now
button in this context constitutes false and deceptive advertising. But we have

219 See HOOFNAGLE, supra note 122, at 333-35 (noting that “the FTC now enforces on a case-bycase basis” and elects to pursue enforcements “that are likely to have structural effect”).
220 Among large, reputable firms like those that dominate the market for digital media goods,
compliance with FTC norms is likely. See KENNETH A. BAMBERGER & DEIRDRE K. MULLIGAN,
PRIVACY ON THE GROUND: DRIVING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND
EUROPE 68-71 (2015) (describing the incentives created by the FTC’s enforcement authority, which
encourage large companies to self-comply with FTC norms). However, among smaller firms, because
of the extremely low risk of detection, the other priorities of startups, a lack of sophistication, and the
fewer resources available for compliance, there is a greater risk of noncompliance. See Chris Jay
Hoofnagle, US Regulatory Values and Privacy Consequences, Implications for the European Citizen, 2(2)
EUR. DATA PROTECTION L. REV. 169 (2016).
221 Lauren Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309, 1371-72 (2015).

376

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 165: 315

also outlined an effective alternative: a short notice that significantly
improved respondents’ comprehension of their rights in digital goods.
Those additional disclosures, which convey information to consumers that
is currently buried in unread and unreadable license terms, could result in at
least two positive developments.222 In the short term, we are confident a short
notice like the one we designed would lead to consumers making more
informed decisions about existing products and services in the marketplace.
Once consumers know digital goods come with substantial restrictions, they
may decide physical copies are worth the occasional inconvenience they
impose. Or consumers may see subscription streaming services as a more
attractive alternative. We might also see a shift in price reflecting those newly
informed consumer preferences.
In the long term, disclosure could spur competition between competing
retailers over the bundles of rights they convey to consumers.223 Today,
competition in the digital media market revolves around the most obvious
and salient characteristic—namely, price. But by lowering the information
costs associated with understanding the rights consumers acquire, short
notices might create incentives to offer more attractive bundles of rights.
Given the concentration of digital media markets and the ongoing control
copyright holders exert over retailers, there is no guarantee that the market
will respond to pressure from consumers for meaningful property rights in
their digital purchases. But unless consumers have accurate information about
those products, their preferences will remain a byproduct of deception.

222 See Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, supra note 121, at 339 (describing the positive
externalities associated with required disclosures, including helping people make better decisions
and inducing enterprises to be more efficient).
223 See Howard Beales et al., Information Remedies for Consumer Protection, 71 AM. ECON. REV.
410, 410 (1981) (“Additional information induces sellers to compete for the patronage of informed
consumers by offering better values.”).
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Basic Demographics of Survey Respondents
Characteristic

Category

Percentage

Sex

Male
Female

49%
51%

Age

18–24
25–34
35–44
45–54
55–64
65+

11%
18%
17%
19%
16%
18%

Income

<$15,000
$15–$25,000
$25–$50,000
$50–$75,000
$75–$100,000
$100–$150,000
>$150,000

13%
12%
24%
17%
12%
12%
9%

Race

White/Caucasian
African American
Hispanic
Asian
Other

80%
9%
6%
4%
1%

Education
Level

< High School
High School/GED
Some College
2-Year Degree
4-Year Degree
Masters Degree
Doctoral Degree
Professional Degree
(e.g., JD/MD)

2%
22%
28%
11%
25%
10%
1%
1%
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Table 2: Size of Test Groups
Condition
Buy Digital
License Now
Buy Physical
Short Notice
Total

Books

Music

Movies

Total

113
101
110
109
433

109
107
107
110
433

111
102
112
108
433

333
310
329
327
1,299

Table 3: Percentage of Consumers Who Thought a Given Product Format and Notice Conveyed Rights
Format

Condition

Digital Movie
Digital Movie
Digital Movie
Ebook
Ebook
Ebook
MP3
MP3
MP3
Blu-ray
Paperback
CD

Buy Now
License Now
Short Notice
Buy Now
License Now
Short Notice
Buy Now
License Now
Short Notice
Buy Now
Buy Now
Buy Now

Own

Keep

Device

Lend

Gift

Will

Resell

Copy

78
69
65
86
50
63
83
62
63
79
85
90

84
75
82
87
81
86
89
80
84
87
88
85

81
75
82
81
84
77
88
89
85
80
85
82

35
42
31
48
46
35
39
42
27
63
75
57

33
39
36
38
36
28
50
42
36
73
70
68

30
28
29
26
26
13
32
26
21
55
47
47

17
23
17
12
14
6
17
13
6
48
53
36

12
18
14
9
8
4
23
16
7
13
14
20

